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the Brief of Appellants.
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Due to an oversight, attached to the

Brief of Appellants as Exhibit B was the filed, but unsigned,
Summary

Judgment, Final Order

court's
corrected

and

decision

in

this

matter.

Exhibit

B,

is

signed

a

Certification

of

Attached

hereto

copy

of

the

the

lower

as

lower
the

court's

Summary Judgment, Final Order and Certification.
The

Appellants-Plaintiffs
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substitute

the
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
i t * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES
(USA) INC., and HERCULES,
INCORPORATED,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINAL
ORDER AND CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the
Utah State Tax Commission,
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO,
Utah State Tax Commissioner,
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN,
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T.
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake
County Treasurer; and GRANT L.
PENDLETON, Tooele County
Treasurer,

Civil No. 88-3457
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Before the Court are reciprocal motions for partial
summary judgment and other related reciprocal motions to strike

various supporting affidavits and attached exhibits.
filed

extensive memoranda, appeared

argued orally.

through

The parties

their .counsel

Plaintiffs appeared by and through their attor-

neys, Maxwell A. Miller and Kent W. Winterholler.
appeared

by

and

and

through

their

Defendants

attorneys, Bill Thomas

Peters,

special Deputy Salt Lake County and Tooele County attorney, and
Karl Hendricksen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney.
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and
having considered
parties,

issued

legal authorities and memoranda filed by the
its

Memorandum

motions on April 11, 1989.
and being

otherwise

Decision

on

the

above-stated

Based on that Memorandum Decision,

fully

advised

in the premises, the Court

hereby enters the following Summary Judgment, Final Order, and
Certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
1.

The Court rules that plaintiffs lack standing to

contest the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987)
under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
2.
(1987)

is

concern,

in
and

The Court

rules that Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15

furtherance
as

such,

of

is

resolving

a matter

constitutional

under

of

statewide

Article,

XIII

Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
3.

The

Court

rules

that

the

revenue

distribution

aspect of the funding mechanism established by Utah Code Ann. S
17-19-15

(1987)

does

not

mandate
-2-

revenue

sharing

between

counties, and, therefore, does not violate that provision of
Article XIII, Section 5 which permits only consensual revenue
sharing,
4.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies plain-

tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
5.

The Court grants defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment as it pertains to the constitutionality of Utah Code
Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution.
6.

The Court denies the parties' respective motions

7.

The Court dismisses plaintiffs' Amended Complaint,

to strike.

with respect to its First Cause of Action, with prejudice.
8.

The Court rules that there are multiple parties in

the present action and that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint raises
multiple claims.
9.

The Court rules that the Summary Judgment entered

herein is a final order, wholly disposes of plaintiffs' First
Cause of Action, and would be appealable but for the presence of
plaintiffs' remaining claims.
10.

The Court determines and certifies that there is

no just reason to delay the plaintiffs from taking an appeal from
the present Summary Judgment and Final Order.

-3-

DATED this

1

day of &$&,

1989,

BY THE CQORT:

IORABLE TIMOTHY K. HANSON
Third District Court Judge
Tax Division

Qtii"*'
^ppro^ed 'as to f orin
Bill Thomas Peters
Attorney for County Defendants
239:050589A
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (1989), and Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
This is an appeal by Kennecott Corporation, Morton
Thiokol,

Inc.,

Barrick

Resources

(USA)

Inc.,

and

Hercules,

Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition") from a
Summary Judgment and Final Order entered on August 7, 1989 by the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
in favor of Utah State Tax Commission, et. aJ.

(hereinafter

referred to as the "County and State defendants"), holding that
(1) the Coalition members lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987); (2) Utah Code
Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) furthers a statewide purpose and is thus
constitutional; and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) does not
mandate revenue sharing in violation of Article XIII, Section 5
of the Utah Constitution.

1

All parties to this proceeding are listed in the caption of
this case.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do the Coalition members have standing to chal-

lenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987),
which establishes a system for assessing, collecting aid distributing property taxes?
2.

Does Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) .mpose upon

the Coalition an obligation to pay state taxes for the benefit of
2
Salt Lake and Tooele Counties

m

violation of Article XIII,

Section 5 of the Utah Constitution?
3.

Does the revenue distribution aspect oi Utah Code

Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) mandate revenue sharing between counties
in violation of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Co istitution?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article

XIII,

Section

5

of

the

Utah

Constitution

provides:
The Legislature shall not impose taxes fo •
the purpose of any county, city, town o •
other municipal corporation, but may, by law
vest in the corporate authorities thereof
respectively, the power to assess and collec
taxes for all purposes of such corporation
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
2 The Coalition members also own property in Box Elder, Davis
and Utah counties which have also imposed upon Coalit:on members
ad valorem taxes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-1!; however,
only Salt Lake and Tooele counties are named defendants to this
action.
-2-

contained in this Constitution, political
subdivisions may share their tax and other
revenues with other political subdivisions as
provided by statute.
Senate Bill 151, 1986, Utah Laws Ch. 109 Section 1,
Codified at Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, is set forth in Appendix A
to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Proceedings.

In 1987, the Coalition

members, as taxpayers in Utah, had imposed upon them an assessment, collection, and distribution

levy under Utah Code Ann.

§ 17-19-15 in the amount of .0005 of the assessed value of their
property.

Record at 9.

On May 25, 1988, the Coalition commenced

this action by filing a Complaint in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Record at 2-37.

The

Coalition's Complaint, as amended, sought a declaratory judgment
that the Act violated various provisions of the state and federal
constitutions, recovery of taxes paid under protest, and injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of the Act.

Record at 53-66.

The Coalition's first claim for relief asserts that the Act is
unconstitutional because it violates Article XIII, Section 5 of
the Utah Constitution.

Record at 57-60.

The County and State defendants answered the Complaint.
Record at 67-90 and 273-280.

The Coalition and County defendants
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then filed reciprocal motions for partial summary judgment with
supporting

affidavits

Coalition's

first

and

claim

exhibits

for relief*

with

respect

Record

at

to

the

98-137 and

270-272.
2.

Decision of the Court.

On April 11, 1989, the

district court entered a Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as
Exhibit A (Record at 291-300), and on August 7, 1989, entered a
Summary Judgment, Final Order, and Certification, attached hereto
as Exhibit B (Record at 308-311).

The district court ruled that

the Coalition members lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) under Article XIII,
Section
S

5

17-19-15

of

the

Utah

Constitution;

that

Utah

Code

Ann.

(1987) is in furtherance of resolving matters of

statewide concern, and therefore, is constitutional under Article
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution; and that the revenue
distribution aspect established

by Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15

(1987) does not mandate revenue sharing between counties, and,

3

The State defendants have preferred to remain neutral
throughout the entire proceeding, having neither joined nor
participated in either party's summary judgment motion.
The
State defendants are in a difficult and inconsistent position
since the Tax Commission Chairman has filed an affidavit describing what he sees as the expedient benefits of the Act (Record at
260-263), while the Attorney General has opined that the Act is
unconstitutional. Record at 14-29.
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therefore, does not violate Article XIII, Section 5 which permits
only consensual revenue sharing.

Record at 309.

Based on the

foregoing, the district court denied the Coalition's Motion for
Partial
Motion

Summary

Judgment

and

for Partial Summary

constitutionality

granted

Judgment

the County defendants'
as

of Utah Code Ann. §

it pertained
17-19-15

Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.

to the

(1987) under
Record at 310.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
district court certified that there was no just reason to delay
the Coalition from taking an appeal from the present Summary
Judgment and Final Order.

Record at 310.

The district court determined in its Memorandum Decision "that Section 17-19-15 is in furtherance of resolving a
matter of statewide concern, and as such is constitutional under
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution."
297.

As a basis

Record at

for its determination, the district court

adopted the arguments the County defendants made in their Memorandum In Response To Motion For Partial Summary Judgment And In
Support

Of

Defendants'

Cross-Motion

attached hereto as Exhibit C.

For

Summary

Record at 177-215.

Judgment,

The district

court also ruled that the revenue distribution aspect of the Act
does not mandate revenue sharing, but rather provides for consensual

revenue

sharing

since

it
-5-

"merely

provides

that

where

counties generate proceeds in excess of budgeted amounts that are
the result of a uniform statewide tax levy, that those excess
funds may be diverted to other counties in conformity with the
funding

programs

uniformity
added).

in the spirit

assessment

of

valuation."

the

statewide purpose of

Record

at

297

(emphasis

Additionally, the district court noted that the Utah

Association of Counties, the Utah League of Cities and Towns, and
the Utah State School Board Associations have, on behalf of their
members, supported Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 and, on that basis,
concluded that "even if the statutory provision mandated revenue
sharing, it would not be offensive to Article XIII, Section 5,
because the counties do so voluntarily."

Record at 298.

Finally, the district court ruled that the Coalition
members do not have standing to bring this lawsuit because the
individual counties or their elective representatives are the
only entities that have standing.
3.

Statement of Facts.

Record at 297.
In the 1986 General Session

of the Utah Legislature, the Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 151, codified at Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, entitled "An Act
Relating to Counties; Providing for the Collection, Assessment,
and Distribution Costs Charged by the County and Providing an
Effective Date" (hereinafter referred to as the

"Act").

The Act

imposes a mandatory statewide levy upon all real property for the
-6-

purpose of defraying costs incurred by Utah's counties in assessing, collecting and distributing property taxes for, in behalf
of, and to various taxing entities and districts located within
each county's geographical boundaries.
Before

the

Act

became

effective,

each

county

was

responsible for budgeting the costs for assessment, collection
and distribution of property taxes for that county.

Each county

determined the categories of costs and expenses involved in the
assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes it
levied.

The individual county then set a tax rate at the appro-

priate level to fund these costs.

The state did not participate,

nor did it have any responsibility, in determining county budgets
and did not participate in levying taxes to fund these county
purposes.
Under

the Act's

provisions, individual

counties

no

longer have the discretion to identify, budget, and levy for
costs the county deems legitimate.

Each county is now required

to separately budget for certain categorical costs incurred in
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes
and

related

appraisal

auditor for review.
to cover these costs.

programs

for

submission

to

the

state

The counties no longer set a local tax rate
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(1).
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The budget submitted to the state auditor is limited to
certain categories of allowable costs which the state auditor
establishes, and is subject to certification for compliance with
these set categories.

id. § 17-19-15(2).

After certification by

the state auditor, the aggregate costs o£ each county are transmitted

to

the

State Tax Commission

"for determination

of a

mandatory statewide tax rate sufficient to meet these expenditures ."

Id. § 17-19-15(3) (emphasis added).

The tax rate set by

the State Tax Commission may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per
dollar of taxable value of taxable property, with certain exceptions.

Id. § 17-19-15(4).

Any revenues received by a county

pursuant to the provisions of the Act, in excess of the amount of
its certified budget, are required to be transmitted to the state
treasurer for distribution to other counties.

Id,. § 17-19-15(6).

The result of this redistribution scheme created by the
Act is that the counties with a large property tax base subsidize
counties with a smaller property tax base.

In short, two groups

of counties result; some counties are "exporting counties" and
4
other are "importing counties." Record at 166.

4

See also Affidavit of Auston Johnson, III and its attached
Exhibit Al. Apparently due to oversight, the Johnson Affidavit
Footnote continued on next page.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Article XIII, Section 5 is a specific constitutional
prohibition against the state legislature's imposition of taxes
for county purposes or functions.

The purpose of this constitu-

tional proscription is to preserve the autonomy of local governments by precluding state officials from influencing or deciding
local issues.

This Court has repeatedly interpreted this consti-

tutional provision as prohibiting the state from levying taxes
for county purposes.
The Act

imposes

a mandatory

statewide tax

for the

purpose of funding local county functions in violation of Article
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.

Because the Act

violates Article XIII, Section 5, the district court erred in
granting

summary

judgment

to

the

County

defendants.

While

Footnote continued from previous page.
and the Motion to Supplement the Record requesting permission to
enter the Johnson Affidavit into evidence was not made a part of
the record. However, the County defendants' Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Auston Johnson, III is part of the record (Record at
282-286) and is referenced in the district court's Memorandum
Decision when the district court declined to strike the Johnson
Affidavit from the record.
Record at 292. Thus, the Johnson
Affidavit was apparently omitted by error. The Johnson Affidavit
is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
On December 28, 1989, the
Coalition filed a Motion to Correct the Record in the district
court to have the Johnson affidavit and its exhibits included in
the record.
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legislative statutes are presumed valid, the judiciary has the
responsibility

to ensure

that

Constitution are preserved.
statewide

purposes

the

safeguards

placed

in

our

Characterizing the Act as being for

cannot

and

constitutional prohibition.

does

not

override

a

specific

To so hold renders Article XIII,

Section 5 meaningless because the stat€> could levy for county
purposes at any time under the guise that a statewide purpose is
being furthered.
Each

Coalition

provisions of the Act.

member

has

standing

to

contest

the

This Court clarified standing guidelines

in Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796
(Utah 1986).
ria

this

"suffered

The Coalition members meet all of the three crite-

Court

listed:

some distinct

First,

the

and palpable

Coalition

members

have

injury that gives

[the

Coalition] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."
Id. at 799.

Second, no one else has "a greater interest in the

outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at
all unless [the Coalition] has standing to raise the issue."

Id.

And third, the issue raised in this appeal is unique and of great
public importance which should be decided in furtherance of the
public interest.

Id.

Finally,
counties.

the

Act

mandates

revenue

sharing

amongst

Regardless of whether the counties agree to share
-10-

revenues, the Act is written in the imperative mode, mandating
compliance.
sharing,

and

The Act does not provide for consensual revenue
this

clearly

violates

permits only consensual sharing.

the

Constitution,

which

Furthermore, the counties have

failed to take appropriate and necessary actions under which
legal consent to share revenues is authorized.

Informal county

actions or the vote of county associations are not the requisite
actions to be taken by a county in order to authorize revenue
sharing.

Therefore, the revenue sharing scheme fails for lack of

proper authorization.
ARGUMENT
Introduction.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that Summary Judgment is appropriate if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).

Bowen v. Riverton

Although it was appropriate for

the district court to grant summary judgment in the absence of
factual disputes, the district court erred in granting the County
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because the Act
violates Article XIII, Section 5.

The Coalition, rather than the

County defendants, is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.

Accordingly, the district court's summary
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judgment and

final order should be reversed with directions to enter summary
judgment for the Coalition.
I.

THE COALITION MEMBERS HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 17-19-15.
The district court erred in holding that the Coalition

members lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of the
Act.

This Court, in Terracor, supra at 798, summarized Utah case

law on standing as follows:
The first general criterion is that the
'[p]laintiff must be able to show that he has
suffered some distinct and palpable injury
that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute.'
Second, if a Plaintiff does not have standing
under the first criteria, he may have standing if no one else has a greater interest in
the outcome of the case and the issues are
unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular Plaintiff has standing to raise
the issue.
Third, even though standing is not found to
exist under the first two criteria, a Plaintiff may nonetheless have standing if the
issues are unique and are of such great
public importance that they ought to be
decided
in
furtherance
of
the
public
interest.
The Coalition members satisfy each of these standards.
First, as taxpayers and owners of real property, the Coalition
members are directly affected by the distribution of tax proceeds.

Indeed, the distribution scheme of the Act requires the
-12-

Coalition to pay a tax, which, in part, would not be otherwise
due.

More importantly, because the levy assessed against the

Coalition reflects the counties' budgeted costs in which the
Coalition has no presence, the Coalition members have suffered a
real and "palpable" injury.

If the Coalition members do not have

standing to contest the constitutionality of this distribution
scheme, they will be denied an opportunity to seek any redress
since they have no right to representation before counties in
which they have no presence or property (but yet are bearing the
costs of county assessment operations).
Coalition members

have the requisite

outcome of the legal dispute."

For this reason, the
"personal

stake

in the

Id.

Second, no one else has a greater interest in the
outcome of this case than Coalition members or similarly situated
taxpayers.

Unless the Coalition raises this issue it is unlikely

to be raised at all.

The Coalition members own substantial

property in Tooele, Box Elder, Utah, Davis, and Salt Lake Counties and pay substantial taxes under the Act.

Most other taxpay-

ers have less valuable property and cannot justify the necessary
legal expenses to challenge the Act.

Moreover, this Court has

previously held that local taxpayers have standing to contest
state tax levies to fund county functions (school fund budget
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items).

In Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P. 2d

960, 962-63 (Utah 1986), (footnote 1), this Court stated:
We find that applying the general principles
enunciated in the cases noted, individual
taxpayers in Salt Lake City would be granted
standing on the basis that there are no more
likely appellants and the issue is otherwise
unlikely to be raised.
Third, the issues presented in this case are unique and
of great public interest.

Certainly a statutory taxing scheme

which affects every property owner in Utah by imposing a mandatory statewide levy on each of the 29 counties in this state is
of great public importance.
One additional criteria frequently overlooked in the
Terracor decision is found in footnote four on page 799 which
states

that

M

[i]n

addition, taxpayers

challenge an illegal expenditure."

may

have

standing

to

This additional criteria was

previously recited in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1153 (Utah
1983) wherein this Court stated that

M

[it] has long held that a

taxpayer has standing to prosecute an action against municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state for illegal
expenditures."

See also Olson v. Salt Lake City School District,

supra at 962-63, footnote 1.

A taxpayer's right to sue over the

illegal use of public monies has been extended to include an
action against the state.

Jenkins, supra at 1153.
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To have

standing to challenge the Act the Coalition need not show injury.
In Jenkins, this Court stated:
• [A] taxpayer should be permitted to enjoin
the unlawful expenditure of tax monies in
which he has a pecuniary interest, or to
prevent increased levies for illegal purposes.' In arriving at this conclusion, we
quoted with approval the following language
of the Illinois Supreme Court:
We have repeatedly held that taxpayers
may resort to a court of equity to prevent
the misapplication of public funds, and that
this right is based upon the taxpayers *
equitable ownership of such funds and their
liability to replenish the public treasury
for the deficiency which would be caused by
the misappropriation.
Id.

(citations omitted).
Finally, it should be noted that one of the Coalition

members has a further right to standing pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-1411 (1987).

Kennecott Corporation paid its 1987

taxes under protest and brought the action below to recover those
taxes; it thus has standing to contest the lawfulness of the
taxes imposed.

"The constitutionality or legality of a tax

statute may be raised in an action that is properly filed pursuant to § 59-11-1 [sic] [(§ 59-11-11 (supp. 1981) is the predecessor to § 59-2-1411 (1987))] in the district court."

-15-

Id. at 1152.

II.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-19-15 VIOLATES ARTICLE
XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
A.

The Supreme Court of Utah has Repeatedly Enforced

Article XIII, Section

5 to Prohibit State Levies

for County

Purposes.
Since 1901, and as recently as 1979, the Utah Supreme
Court has interpreted Article XIII, Section 5 to preclude the
legislature from forcing county governments to tax for state
5
purposes.
None of the cases interpreting Article XIII, Section
5 has overruled any of the preceding cases; and all consistently
stress

three

salient

doctrines

emanating

from

Article

XIII,

Section 5:
1.

The state, acting through its legislature,
may impose taxes only for a state purpose.

2.

The levy and collection of local ad valorem
taxes is a county function, not a state
function, even though the state, acting
through the Tax Commission, must "assess" or
value certain properties on a unitary basis.

5

The significant cases interpreting Article XIII, Section 5
are: State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061 (1901); State
v. Eldredqe, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904); Salt Lake County v.
Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 124 P. 560 (1913); Bailey v. Van
Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925); The Best Foods v.
Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001 (1930); Smith v. Carbon
County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259 (1936); Tribe v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979)? Baker v. Matheson, 607
P.2d 233 (Utah 1979) .
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3.

Article XIII, Section 5 precludes
interference with county taxation.

state

Each of these points are explained below through a brief survey
of relevant cases,
1.

The state, acting through its legislature, may

impose taxes only for a state purpose.
Article XIII, Section 5's underlying intent, as first
declared in State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 149, 66 P. 1061,
1062 (1901), is to prevent the state from compelling a county to
levy taxes for county functions or purposes:
When the county government is established
separate from the state, each is compelled
to bear its own burdens, and not assume
those of the other.
The legislature is
forbidden to impose taxes for county
purposes, as is the county for state
purposes, and the state is not authorized
to impose taxes for other than state
purposes.
(Emphasis added.)
In Standford, the Utah Supreme Court held that a state
statute, which required the county commission of each county to
appoint a horticulturist as a tree inspector, violated Article
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
The aspects of the statute challenged in Standford that
offended Article XIII, Section 5 were: (1) The state inspector,
with the advice of the state board, appointed deputy inspectors
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as he saw fit, thus compelling the county to "levy and collect
taxes with which to pay such officers."

Icl-

(2) County commis-

sioners had no supervisory control over the inspectors, which "in
no sense can be called county officers."

Id.

(3) The county was

compelled to audit and pay the monthly salaries of the inspector
and deputies.
Upon these facts the Standford Court concluded:
[S]ection 5, art. 13, of the constitution,
not only limits local or county taxation to
local county purposes, but it was also
intended as a limitation upon the power of
the legislature to grant the right or
impose the duty of creating a debt or
levying a tax to any person or body other
than the corporate authorities of the
county. Nor can the state compel a county
to incur a debt or to levy a tax for the
purpose named in the act without its
consent.
Id. at 106 3 (emphasis added).
Standford thus stands for the principle that legislation violates the mandatory provisions of Article XIII, Section 5
if it attempts to achieve a state purpose

through

local ad

valorem taxation, a function exclusively reserved to the counties.
The more recent Utah Supreme Court cases (decided after
1940) confirm Standford's rationale by holding that Article XIII,
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Section 5 is not violated as long as revenues from state taxing
schemes are not being used to fund local county functions.
For instance, in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court upheld, against
an Article XIII, Section 5 challenge, a statute that required a
portion of property taxes to be diverted directly to help pay off
revenue bonds issued by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency
to finance a redevelopment project.

In dismissing the Article

XIII, Section 5 claim the Tribe Court held "it needs only to be
said that the law is well settled that in exercising the powers
of the state the legislature may require the revenue of a municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other than that
for which the taxes were levied,"

Id. at 504 (emphasis added).

It is important to emphasize the context in which the
Tribe Court's commentary on Article XIII, Section 5 was made.
The Court repeatedly stressed that the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency, which issued tax allocation and parking revenue
bonds,

was

"a

quasi-municipal

corporation,

a

public

created for beneficial and necessary public purposes.

agency

"It is not

a true municipal corporation, having power of local government,
but an agency of the state designed for state purposes."
503 (emphasis added).

Id. at

Since the agency was part of state govern-

ment, Article XIII, Section 5, which precludes state interference
-19-

with county taxation powers, did not apply.

Given that distinc-

tion, the state in Tribe could require that state tax revenue
collected by the county be applied to state purposes.

The Tribe

Court found that no further analysis of Article XIII, Section 5
was necessary because the revenue expenditures were not for local
county purposes.
In Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598
P. 2d

1339

(Utah

1979),

the Utah

Supreme Court, specifically

relying upon the Tribe decision, upheld a redevelopment act that,
as

Salt

Lake

County

assessed by the county

alleged,

required

diversions

of

taxes

for county purposes to the defendant

Murray City for Murray City redevelopment.

Salt Lake County

sought to distinguish Tribe on the basis that the statute at
issue in Salt Lake County v. Murray City authorized the diversion
of assessed

taxes, normally

accruing

to the benefit

of

the

county, from the county to Murray City; and further that such a
diversion would shift the burden of paying for improvements from
Murray City to Salt Lake County as a whole.

Consequently, Salt

Lake County claimed that it would be forced to increase its mill
levy to compensate for lost revenues and that this constituted an
imposition of taxes on Salt Lake County residents for Murray City
purposes, contrary to the intent and language of Article XIII,
Section 5.
-20-

The Court disagreed with Salt Lake County on a purely
factual basis:
[I]t should be noted that Salt Lake County
will not lose its vested authority to
'collect taxes for all purposes of such
corporation' as provided in Article XIII,
Section 5. Salt Lake County will not even
be subordinated to the redevelopment agency
in the collection of taxes.
It will be
held to the amount and proportion of tax
revenues that it would have received had no
redevelopment plan been adopted, and that
amount will remain static for that period
of time during which the bonds of redevelopment are being retired.
Id. at 1342 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
The Court further stressed, quoting Tribe, that the
Murray City Redevelopment Agency was a quasi-municipal corporation, and not a special commission.

Accordingly, the Murray City

Redevelopment Agency:
is an arm of the State government, designed
for State purposes with powers granted by
the Legislature separate and distinct from
the municipality within whose territory it
may be established.
The Agency benefits
the public at large by alleviating urban
blight, which was also recognized by this
Court in Tribe as a problem of statewide,
not merely local concern.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court in Salt Lake County v. Murray City
Redevelopment avoided a constitutional impasse with Article XIII,
Section 5 by finding as a factual matter that (1) the statutory
-21-

scheme Salt Lake County challenged did not impact its power to
collect taxes; and that (2) the Redevelopment Agency was an arm
of state government and thus could, if authorized by the legislature, raise revenue for state purposes.
In its most recent analysis of Article XIII, Section 5,
Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979), the Court followed
this same rationale in upholding, as against an Article XIII,
Section

5 challenge, a statute

that

authorized

certain home

owners and renters to file claims for refunds from the state
general fund.

The operative provisions of the challenged act

permitted the "owner of a dwelling" and the "renter of a dwelling
comprising a household" to file claims for refunds of "state
general fund free revenue."

The act's underlying purpose, as

determined by the legislature and quoted Ln the opinion was:
to provide for a refund of the excess of
the free revenues in the state general fund
on an equitable basis to those . . . who
have experienced the primary impact of the
increases in the property taxes, and
increased living costs, this refund to be
effectuated through payments from these
free revenues and computed on the basis
provided for in this section.
Id. at 236 (emphasis in original).
The Baker Court had little trouble in dismissing the
Article XIII, Section 5 challenge since:
the Act is not a taxing measure, and there
simply is no substance to the proposition
-22-

that the Act 'impose[s] taxes for the
purposes of a county, city, town or other
municipal corporation- . . . '
The Act
makes no provision whatsoever for any
payments to or for any county, city, town
or municipal corporation.
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
As with prior opinions, the Baker Court stressed that
Article XIII, Section 5 only applied to state-compelled taxation
for county purposes.

The provision otherwise does not preclude

state financing measures, such as those at issue in Tribe, Salt
Lake County and Baker.
2.

The levy and collection of local ad valorem taxes

is a county function, not a state function, even though the
state, acting through the Tax Commission, must "assess" or value
certain properties on a unitary basis.
In State v. Eldredqe, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904) the
Utah Supreme Court, again invoking Article XIII, Section 5, held
that a statute giving the State Board of Equalization power to
levy property taxes on property wholly located within one county
was unconstitutional because that is an exclusive county function.

In construing Article XIII, Section 5 the Eldredge Court

commented:
If the construction which the relator seeks
to place upon that language of the Constitution [(the language of Article XIII,
Section 11 creating a State Board of
Equalization and conferring upon it such
-23-

other duties as may be prescribed by law)]
were to be adopted, then ther€> would seem
to be no reason why the State Board, by
legislative enactment, might not be authorized to also levy and collect the taxes
upon property situate wholly within one
county, or to perform many of the other
local duties which the legislature might
see fit to impose upon the board. As will
be noticed, this would clearly be in
violation of section 5, art, 13, which
directs the Legislature to vest in the
corporate authorities the power to assess
and collect taxes for local purposes.
Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
3.

Article XIII, Section 5 precludes state interfer-

ence with county taxation.
Consistent with the cases discussed above, which hold
that ad valorem taxation is a county function, are cases which
uphold a challenged statute under Article XIII, Section 5 because
they do not involve taxation.
For example, in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42
Utah 548, 124 P. 560 (1913) Salt Lake County

(the "County")

brought an action against Salt lake City to recover the costs of
caring for, educating, and maintaining certain delinquent children who were ordered by the juvenile court to be sent to a
detention home maintained by the County.

The County maintained

the detention facility pursuant to state law which provided that
upon the recommendation of the Juvenile Court Commission, the
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Board of County Commissioners "shall establish . . . and maintain
detention homes

. . . .M

The act further provided that the

county establishing and maintaining such a detention home was
entitled to recover from cities of the first and second class the
support and maintenance costs.

Salt Lake City contended that the

law authorizing a county to recover against a city was unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it violated Article XIII,
Section 5.
In discussing

the act at

issue, the Supreme Court

stated, "What is sought to be accomplished by that law does not
relate to the assessment or collection of taxes; nor does it
regulate or attempt to regulate county or township officers."
Id. at 563 (emphasis added).

The Court continued to state that

"What is required from Salt Lake City is required from it as an
arm or agency of state government, and in no way affects or
interferes with any of its functions as a municipal corporation
governing its own local affairs."

Id. (emphasis added).

In its analysis of the Article XIII, Section 5 issue,
the Court held that "[t]he Legislature in exercising sovereign
powers of the state in our judgment had the right to require both
Salt Lake county [sic] and Salt Lake City to each draw upon its
general fund to defray the expenses of caring for and educating
delinquent

children

who

became
-25-

wards

of

the

juvenile court

. . . ."

IcL at 564.

The Court further held, "[W]e think that

we have already made clear that the purpose to which the fund in
question is sought to be applied is for general public good, and
not for a private purpose; that such purpose is not one which
pertains to the corporate powers or interest of Salt Lake City."
Id.

As explicitly recognized by the Court, Salt Lake County did

not concern the imposition of taxes for county purposes and thus
Article XIII, Section 5 was not violated.
Later cases also interpret the proscriptions of Article
XIII, Section 5 as limited to county taxation powers.

In Bailey

v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925) the Utah Supreme
Court held that the Article XIII, Section 5 claim before it was:
wholly insupportable because the statute in
question does not impose any obligation
whatever upon the county.
The county is
merely given legal power to enter into the
contract and provide the funds or not, as
its duly constituted officers may elect.
There is no imposition of taxes, direct or
indirect, by legislative authority upon the
county, and no interference with local self
government by the county.
Id. at 457.

(emphasis added).

In The Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P.
1001 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court upheld, against a challenge
under Article XIII, Section 5, a statute that imposed a $5.00
annual permit fee payable by the seller of oleomargarine to the

-26-

general fund of a county, city or town.

Explicitly, in Best

Foods, the Court avoided the Article XIII, Section 5 challenge,
concurring with the defendant's contention that $5.00 fee "for a
permit to sell oleomargarine is not a tax within the meaning of
article

13, § 5, of our

state Constitution."

Id..

at

1002

(emphasis added).
In Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259
(1936),

the Utah

Supreme Court

held that, under Article

I,

Section 24 (mandating the "uniform operation" of all laws of a
"general nature") a statute that provided for graduated "fees" in
probate

proceedings

based

upon

the

size

of

the estate was

unconstitutional.
The Smith Court raised the Article XIII, Section 5,
issue sua sponte because it was "not argued in the briefs of
counsel and therefore we refrain from answering it in the present
opinion."

^d. at 262. Nonetheless, the Court in dicta declared:
It is not necessary in the present case to
consider what power, if any, the Legislature has to impose inheritance taxes for
the use and benefits of counties because
the fees provided for in the statute under
review are not inheritance taxes.

Id. (emphasis added.)

-27-

These cases

are

important

because they stress that

legislation which does not impact the levy and collection of ad
valorem taxes does not offend Articles XIII, Section 5.
Finally, while not binding on the Court, it is relevant
that on February 11, 1988, the Utah Attorney General issued a
Formal Opinion concluding that the Act does interfere with the
local county functions of levying and collecting taxes and is
thus unconstitutional.
Record

14-29.

Formal Opinion No, 88-01, Feb. 11, 1988*

In this Formal Opinion, the Attorney General

concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 violates Article XIII,
Section

5 because

counties:

the provisions

of the Act

"mandate" that

1) collect taxes for their own use; 2) share their tax

revenues with other counties regardless of their consent; and
3) submit to the other described state controls.
No. 88-01, p. 11 (emphasis added).
B.
Purposes

Formal Opinion

Record at 25.

The Constitution Prohibits a State Levy for County

Even

if

a

Concomitant

Statewide

Purpose

is

Being

Furthered.
Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution sets
forth that

w

[a]ll political power is inherent in the people."

The state Constitution therefore serves as a limitation on the
exercise of the sovereign power of the state inherent in the
people, and the state

legislature
-28-

must, accordingly, operate

within

those

Coalition's

constitutional

argument

in

limits.

this

case

The

is

that

essence
Utah

of

the

Code

Ann.

§ 17-19-15 attempts to do what the Constitution prohibits; thus
it is unconstitutional, irrespective of any concomitant statewide
purpose that might be furthered.
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution does
not grant authority but constrains authority.

Once again, the

proscription is that the "Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof,
respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all
purposes of such corporation. . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

In other words, the state legislature cannot levy taxes
for the purposes of any county for any reason.
is not conditional.

This restriction

"The terms of the constitution are made

mandatory and prohibitory unless expressly declared to be otherwise. "

State v. Standford, supra at 1063 (emphasis added).

Consequently,

a

state

cannot

levy

6

for

county

purposes

in

It is relevant to note that Article XIII, Section 5 specifically allows one exception to its proscription, which is that
counties may share their revenues with other counties if they so
consent. Therefore, if the intent of the Constitution was that
Article XIII, Section 5 would not apply if a concomitant state
purpose was being furthered, the constitutional framers would
have logically included this exception as well.
-29-

disregard of a constitutional restraint on the pretext that a
concomitant statewide purpose is being furthered.
In a recent decision, this Court, following a similar
principle, rejected the argument that a statute

furthering a

state purpose can ignore a constitutional prohibition.

In Utah

Technology Finance Corporation v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah
1986)

the

Utah

established

by

Technology
the

Utah

Finance

Technology

Corporation
and

("UTFC"),

Innovation

as

Act, had

committed one million dollars of public funds to subscribe to
stock, indirectly, in selected businesses.
argued

that the Utah Technology

and

The Attorney General

Innovation Act violated

Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution which prohibits
the state from "subscribing] to stock or bonds in aid of any
. . . corporate enterprise- or undertaking."

UTFC sought judicial

approbation on the ground that the legislature has found the
subscription of stock in fledging businesses to have a public
purpose.

Rl. at 413.

This Court responded:

[T]he legislature's findings of a public
purpose are of no avail in this instance.
The constitutional convention in promulgating
section 29 and its subsequent adoption by the
electorate of this state have foreclosed any
speculation or further debate on that issue.
Whether the public benefits thereby is of no
consequence.
This means of assistance is
forbidden by section 29.
The state is
foreclosed from subscribing, even though the
legislature may determine that public benefits will flow therefrom.
-30-

Id. at 413-414.
This same rule applies to this case.
violates

a constitutional

prohibition

A statute that

cannot be validated by

finding that a statewide purpose is served.

Regardless of the

merits of a statute and any potential public good it may accomplish, if that statute intrudes upon the Constitution it must
fail.

The Act is unconstitutional because it transgresses a

specific constitutional provision.
C.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 Is a State Tax Being

Levied For County Purposes.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act, in part, on the finding that
the Act "does not on its face dictate to the counties that they
shall impose taxes for some specific county purpose."
296.

This is incorrect.

Record at

The Act specifically provides that the

revenues generated from the "mandatory statewide tax rate" will
be used to offset "all costs incurred in the assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal
programs."

Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(1), (3) and (5). It is the

duty, responsibility, and constitutional right of each county to
have exclusive control and domain over inherently county purposes.

Article XIII, Section 5 provides that the power to assess

and collect taxes for all county purposes may be delegated to the
-31-

individual counties, and the state itself cannot exercise such
powers-

State v. Eldredqe, supra at 340.

The Court stressed

this point by interpreting Article XIII, Section 5 as vesting the
levy and collection of ad valorem taxes with the counties as an
exclusive county function, for county purposes, which authority
cannot be assumed or delegated to others.
supra at 1062.

State v. Standford,

Thus the costs, expenses, salaries of county

officials, etc. involved in the assessment, collection, and levy
of ad valorem property taxes are expenses and costs specifically
7
related to county purposes.
In an effort to prove that the Act does not impose a
tax for a "county purpose," the County defendants have referred
to the Tax Commission's various supervisory powers and duties
over counties.
Commission's

The County defendants then argue that the Tax

statutory

general constitutional

duties
duty to

are

circumscribed

"review proposed

within

the

bond issues,

revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize
the assessment and valuation of property within the counties."
Article XIII, § 11. From these and other such duties, the County
defendants conclude that "the legislature and the Tax Commission

7

See 106 A.L.R. 906 (1937) for a discussion and description
of other expenses and costs incurred by a county/local municipality that are related to local purposes.
-32-

have, to a large degree, completely assume[d] control of the
local administration of the property tax system."

Record at 180.

The County defendants exhaustive recitation of the Tax
Commission's supervisory duties appears to advance the following
logic:
mandate,

(1) the Tax Commission, by statute and constitutional
has

general

supervisory

control

over

the counties*

assessment, collection and equalization functions; (2) the Act is
a legislative attempt at equalization; and, (3) therefore, the
Act

is

within

the

constitutional

framework

of

the

Tax

Commission's duties.
The
premise.

fatal

flaw

in

this

logic

lies

in the second

It is an unwarranted and unsupported logical leap to

assume that because the Tax Commission has general supervisory
powers over equalization and assessment that it also has equivalent powers over county authority to levy taxes.

The Court

should decline to make that leap for two reasons.
First, Utah Supreme Court cases interpreting Article
XIII, Section 5 make it indisputably clear that the levy of ad
valorem taxes is a county function, for county purposes which
cannot be assumed by or delegated to others.
supra at 1062.

State v. Standford,

Further the Standford Court stated that " [u]nder

the constitution the state has no power to make a disposition of
county funds, and require that they be appropriated for other and
-33-

different purposes than those
county they were collected,"

for which by authority of the

id. at 1063-

Standford also held

that the state could not "compel a county to incur a debt or to
levy a tax . . . without its consent."

I^d.

As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Eldredge, invoking Article XIII, Section 5, held that a statute
giving the State Board of Equalization (the predecessor to the
Utah

State

Tax

Commission) power

to

assess

property

wholly

located within one county was unconstitutional, notwithstanding
the Board's general supervisory powers.

In construing Article

XIII, Section 5, the Eldredge Court stated, as extensively quoted
earlier, that the State Board of Education could not levy and
collect taxes on property wholly situated within one county:
As will be noticed, this would clearly be in
violation of section 5, art. 13, which
directs the Legislature to vest in the
corporate authorities the power to assess and
collect taxes for local purposes.
Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
Eldredge, therefore, is authority that - whatever the
oversight responsibilities of state taxing authorities - state
power over the taxing function of local governments stops far
short of the actual levy and collection of a tax.

By constitu-

tional mandate, the levy and collection of an ad valorem tax is a
county function.

The Act, by vesting the power to impose local
-34-

ad valorem taxes in state officials, unconstitutionally intrudes
upon the role of county government.

If that is not so, and the

Tax Commission and other state officials can impose local ad
valorem taxes and redistribute collected taxes to other counties,
Article XIII, Section 5 proscribes nothing, and is meaningless.
This result runs afoul of this Court's consistently repeated
doctrine that statutory enactments that contravene constitutional
provisions are void even though they are arguably meritorious.
See, e.g., Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184
(Utah 1984) and Dean v. Rampton, 556 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976).
Second,

most

of

the

Tax

Commission's

supervisory

control over counties does not relate to the levy of local ad
valorem taxes.

Because Article XIII, Section 5 addresses only ad

valorem taxation by counties, many of the County defendants'
arguments below - no more than a laundry list of state supervisory controls over various county functions - are irrelevant.
For example, the County

defendants

rely

upon

the

statutory

financing scheme for the Uniform School Fund to bootstrap an
argument that the Act

is constitutional.

Specifically, the

argument is "the method of financing an effective and economic
statewide

system

of

property

tax

assessment, collection

and

distribution was closely modeled on the finance mechanism for the
state supported minimum school program
-35-

(Uniform School Fund).

See Utah Code Ann. § 53-7-1 et seg. (1953, as amended)."

Record

at 183.
This argument is unavailing because statewide taxes to
support public education stand upon an entirely different constitutional footing (Article X, Section 1) than do state imposed ad
valorem taxes.

"[A] legislative scheme requiring taxes to be

collected by counties for the benefit of school districts has
been distinguished from a scheme requiring taxes to be collected
by counties for their own use."

Attorney General, Formal Opinion

No.

(citing Board

88-01,

February

11, 1988

of Education v.

Burqon, 62 Utah 162, 217 P. 1112 (1923) and Board of Education v.
Daines, 50 Utah 97, 166 P. 977 (1917)), Record at 19-20.

The

County

for

defendants' position, that

the

funding

mechanism

public schools required under Article X, Section 1 amounts to the
same thing as a taxation scheme prohibited under Article XIII,
Section 5, is obviously wrong.
The same observation applies to the County defendants'
recitation of law enforcement, assessingf and other local functions subject to state supervision.

It does not save the Act

(exclusively concerned with local ad valorem taxation) to argue
that county sheriffs must serve all process when the state is a
party; or that county attorneys must conduct on behalf of the
state all prosecution for public offenses within the counties; or
-36-

that county assessors are supervised by the Tax Commission.
Record at 199.

See

The Act violates Article XIII, Section 5 because

state officials, not county officials, set the levy for local ad
valorem taxes intended to cover collection costs, and the power
of taxation is wrenched from the county, where it constitutionally resides, and is transferred to state officers and entities.
As this Court stated in Best Foods;
There can be no doubt but that the farmers of
our state Constitution recognized the rights
of
the
people
of
Utah
to
local
self-government.
It was to preserve local
self-government free from needless legislative interference that the power to levy
taxes for local purposes was by the state
Constitution vested exclusively in the proper
authority of counties, cities, towns, and
other municipal corporations. The power to
collect and control the revenues of a municipality is of the very essence of local
self-government.
Best Foods, supra at 1003.
III.

THE ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATES REVENUE
SHARING.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 provides

statewide tax which results

for a mandatory

in the forced sharing of county

revenues.

Forced revenue sharing is prohibited by Article XIII,

Section 5.

As discussed above, this Court has held that "[u]nder

the constitution the state has no power to make a disposition of
county funds, and require that they be appropriated for other and
-37-

different purposes than those
county they were collected."

for which by authority of the

State v. Standford, supra at 1063.

The district court erred in holding that the Act does
not force revenue sharing for three reasons.

First, the district

court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 as providing for
consensual sharing.

In its Memorandum Decision, the district

court stated:
An evaluation of the language contained in
Section 17-19-15, merely provides that
where counties generate proceeds in excess
of budgeted amounts that are the result of
a uniform statewide levy, that those excess
funds may be diverted to other counties in
conformity with the funding programs in the
spirit of the statewide purpose of uniformity of assessment in valuation.
Record at 297 (emphasis added).
The district court stated that counties
revenues.

"may" share

The fact of the matter is that revenues received in

excess of certified budgets "shall be transmitted to the state
treasurer for equalization and distribution."
(emphasis added).

Id. § 17-19-15(6)

The counties do not have the option of

withholding excess revenues.

The counties do not have the option

of not participating in the sharing scheme of the Act.

8

This is

The Utah Attorney General stated that the Act "mandatefs]
that counties collect taxes for their own use."
Record at 25
(emphasis added).
-38-

clearly

a

mandatory

revenue

sharing

scheme

and

is

unconstitutional.
Second, the district court erred in holding that "even
if this statutory provision mandated revenue sharing, it would
not be offensive to Article XIII, Section 5, because the counties
do so voluntarily.revenue sharing"

Record at 298.

the district

court

If the statute "mandated
should

have stopped

its

inquiry at that point for mandatory revenue sharing would on its
face be unconstitutional

and

no action by the counties can

legalize an illegal act.

Utah Technology Finance Corporation,

supra.
Furthermore, even if the statute provided for consensual sharing, the counties have not taken the necessary procedural steps to authorize such sharing.

The informal actions of

county officials, or vote of unofficial associations (no legal
status under the Utah Constitution or statutes) are not actions
which meet the procedural requirements necessary to authorize
valid county action.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-2 provides that a county must
exercise its power "only by board of county commissioners or by
agents and officers
authority of law."

acting

under authority of

the board or

Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-16.5 states:

Any county, city, town or other local political subdivision may, at the discretion of the
-39-

local governing body, share its tax and other
revenues with other counties, cities, towns
or other local political subdivision.
Any
decision to share tax and other revenues
shall be by local ordinance, resolution, or
interlocal agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, with its mandatory revenue
sharing, is a state statute, not a local ordinance, resolution or
interlocal agreement.

Moreover, the counties have not provided,

by affidavit or otherwise, any local ordinance, resolution, or
other interlocal

agreement between

counties by which revenue

raised through ad valorem taxation will be shared.
Finally, the fact that Article XIII, Section 5 was
amended in 1983 to provide for the consensual sharing of county
revenues reinforces the conclusion that the Act violates the
constitution

in requiring mandatory revenue sharing.

title of the resolution

proposing
Q

effective in 1983 indicates,
if a county consents.

the amendment

As the

that became

revenue sharing may be permitted,

Anything short of permissive sharing; i.e.

mandatory sharing, is unconstitutional.

9

"PROVIDING FOR PERMISSIVE SHARING OF REVENUES BETWEEN
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE." S.J.R. No. 3, Tax Article
Revision, 1982 Budget Session, Utah State Legislature (emphasis
added).
-40-

IV.
Based

on the

CONCLUSION

foregoing,

Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15

violates Article XIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah and thus is unconstitutional.

Accordingly the district

court erred in granting summary judgment to the County defendants
and the decision of the district court should be reversed with
instructions to enter summary judgment for the Coalition.
DATED this 28th day of December, 1989.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KENNECOTT CORPORATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-88-3457

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
et al.,
Defendants.

Before the Court are reciprocal Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment, and other related reciprocal Motions to Strike various
supporting Affidavits and/or attached exhibits.

The Motions for

Summary Judgment deal with the constitutionality of Section 1719-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

Prior to oral argument,

the parties,- through their respective counsel, filed extensive
Memoranda

of law.

The parties, through their counsel, also

appeared and orally argued their respective positions.

Following

oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement to
further consider the legal authorities cited by the parties, and
to consider counsel's oral presentations.

The Court has now

reviewed the authorities cited by the parties, and has evaluated
the legal positions of both parties, and being otherwise fully
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.

KENNECOTT V. TAX COMM.

As

indicated

PAGE TWO

above,

the

MEMORANDUM DECISION

respective

Motions

for

Partial

Summary Judgment are directed to the plaintiffs1 First Cause of
Action as contained in plaintiffs1 Complaint.
that

Section

17-19-15,

Utah

Code

Ann.,

Plaintiff asserts
1953

as

amended,

(hereinafter 17-19-15), is unconstitutional because the statute
violates the provisions outlined in Article XIII, Section 5, of
the Utah Constitution.

Defendants, on the other hand, assert

that the statutory requirements of Section 17-19-15, are not in
violation

of Article

determination

that

XIII, Section
the

statute

5, and
and

therefore

its

seek a

mandates

are

constitutional.
Intertwined in the respective Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment

are plaintiffs' Motion

to Strike Affidavits

as not

relevant, and defendants' Motion to Strike an Exhibit dealing
with a similar action pending before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
District Court Judge, Sixth Judicial District Court.
Dealing first with the Motion to Strike, the Court declines
to strike either the Affidavits or the Exhibits.

Those documents

will stand and be considered for any probative value that they
may have.

Accordingly, both the plaintiffs' and defendants1

Motions to Strike are denied.
Turning to the merits of the reciprocal Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment, the Court's examination must focus on the

KENNECOTT V. TAX COMM.

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

pronouncements of Section 17-19-15, to determine whether or not
those requirements constitute a levying of taxes by the state for
county purposes.

If Section 17-19-15, evidences such, then the

statute runs afoul of the Constitution and cannot stand.
Section 17-19-15, reads as follows:
Separate budget for costs of assessing, collecting, and
distributing property taxes —
Submission to state
auditor for review — Allowable costs established by
rule — Transmission to tax commission — Limitations
on tax rate — Exceptions — Adjustments.
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of
property
values
and
effective
collection
and
distribution of property tax proceeds, the county
governing body of each county shall annually separately
budget for all costs incurred in the assessment,
collection, and distribution of property taxes and
related appraisal programs and submit those budgets to
the state auditor for review.
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule,
categories of allowable costs and shall certify
submitted budgets
for compliance with
approved
categories.
(3) Upon review and certification by the state
auditor-, the aggregated statewide costs shall be
transmitted
to
the
State Tax Commission
for
determination of a mandatory statewide tax rate
sufficient to meet those expenditures.
By June 8 of
each year the tax commission shall certify the rate to
each county auditor for inclusion upon the tax notice
as a separately listed and identified local levy.
(4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of
.0005 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property
except
for:
(a) mandated or formally adopted
reappraisal programs conforming to tax commission
rules; or (b) actions required to meet legislative,
judicial, or administrative orders. Taxes levied for
this purpose may not be included in determining the

KENNECOTT V. TAX COMM.
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maximum allowable levy for the county or any other
taxing district.
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted
under this section is effective, each taxing district
within
counties which had not previously
levied
separate
assessing,
collecting,
and distributing
levies, shall reduce its property tax levy by an amount
equal to that paid by the taxing district in the
previous year for the cost of assessing, collecting,
and distributing taxes.
(6) Revenues received by each county from the
levy authorized by this section in excess of the amount
set out in the certified budget shall be transmitted to
the state treasurer for equalization and distribution
to the counties in accordance with the certified
budgets. Any revenue excess resulting from an increase
in collection rates upon final settlement shall be
deposited by the state treasurer in a trust account to
be adjusted against subsequent years.

Article XIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, reads as
follows:
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the
purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal
corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate
authorities thereof, respectively, but power to assess
and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
this Constitution, political subdivisions may share
their taxes and other revenues with other political
subdivisions as provided by statute.
In approaching a decision regarding the constitutionality or
lack thereof of any legislative enactment, the accepted criteria
for

evaluation

is

constitutionality.

that

there

should

be

a

presumption

of

On the other hand, the Court has the duty to

carefully examine the contested statute to insure that the final
word of the people, as contained in the Constitution is adhered

KENNECOTT V. TAX COMM.
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to by their elected representatives.

It is not the role of the

courts to examine the merits or lack of merits of any particular
legislation.
appropriate

The
public

responsibility
policy

of

is deposited

determining
with

the

what

is

legislative

branch of government, and is not a function of the judiciary to
examine

the

whether

or

merits
not

the

of

challenged

challenge

legislation

in determining

is sufficient.

In the final

analysis, either the statute passes constitutional muster, or it
does not.
Article XIII, Section

5, prohibits the legislature from

imposing taxes for purposes of any county, city, town or the
like, but does not prohibit the legislature to allow by statute
local governments to levy taxes for their own purposes.

Section

5 goes on to note that the legislature may provide by statute for
local government to share their tax revenue.

Likewise, Article

XIII, Section 5, does not prohibit the legislature from requiring
the counties to impose taxes for state purposes, as opposed to
county purposes.
The pivotal issue then is whether or not Section 17-19-15 is
in actuality the legislature directing the county to levy taxes
for county purposes, or whether or not the statutory enactment
merely

requires

the

statewide purpose.

county

to

impose

taxes

for a state or

KENNECOTT V, TAX COMM.
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The reason and basis for Article XIII, Section 5, of the
Utah Constitution seems to be clear to this Court.

Remote state

officials should not force local elected officials to levy taxes
for

what

functions.

state

officials

think

might

be

necessary

local

What is needed, or what is not needed, in government,

public facilities, and the like at the county level should be
decided by county officials who are closest to the situation and
closest to the needs of the local citizens.
Section

17-19-15, does

not on

its

face dictate to the

counties that they shall impose taxes for some specific county
purpose.

The purpose and the requirements of Section 17-19-15,

is directed to a statewide purpose.

It is not the mere fact that

state officials or other parties interested in maintaining the
constitutionality of the section state that it is for a statewide
purpose, but rather an examination

of the provisions of the

statute

lead

and

what

it

accomplishes

this

Court

to

the

conclusion that the purposes are statewide in scope.
The bases for determining that Section 17-19-15, is for a
statewide purpose are clearly articulated in the Memorandum of
the defendants, and no good purpose would be served here in
restating those arguments.

Suffice it to say that the Court

finds those arguments persuasive, and adopts them as the basis
for this Court's determination that the purposes of the contested
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as

opposed

to

county

purposes.
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that Section
17-19-15, is in furtherance of resolving a matter of statewide
concern,

and

as

such

is constitutional

under Article XIII,

Section 5, of the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiffs further contend that the revenue redistribution
aspect of the funding mechanism established by Section 17-19-15,
also violates Article XIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution
by

mandating

revenue

sharing

between

the

counties.

The

plaintiffs argue that Article XIII, Section 5, only provides for
consensual revenue sharing.
An evaluation of the language contained in Section 17-19-15,
merely provides that where counties generate proceeds in excess
of budgeted amounts that are the result of a uniform statewide
tax

levy,

that those excess funds may be diverted to other

counties in conformity with the funding programs in the spirit of
the statewide purpose of uniformity of assessment in valuation.
The Court also concludes that the only entities that have
standing to complain would be the counties through their elected
representatives, which is not the case here.
the

counties

resist

the

asserted by the plaintiffs.

interpretation

of

To the contrary,
Section 17-19-15,

If individual taxpayers have
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position

of the county,

remedy is with the elected county officials.

their

The Court also

notes that the Utah Association of Counties, the Utah League of
Cities and Towns, and the Utah State School Board Associations
have supported on behalf of its members Section 17-19-15 which is
complained

of by the plaintiffs.

Accordingly,

even

if this

statutory provision mandated revenue sharing, it would not be
offensive to Article XIII, Section 5, because the counties do so
voluntarily.
The Court is satisfied that Article XIII, Section 5, does
not prohibit the distribution of local revenues to effect a
statewide purpose.

The procedure outlined in Section 17-19-15,

is a permissible extension of legislative authority dealing with
a matter of statewide interest.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the
position
between

of

the

Article

appropriate,

and

defendants
XIII,
grants

regarding

Section
the

5,

and

defendants1

the

interrelationship

Section
Motion

17-19-15,
for

is

Partial

Summary Judgment.
Counsel for the defendants are to prepare an appropriate
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit the
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same to the Court for review and signature in conformity with the
Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated this

//

dav of/April/ 1989.

10THY R. HANSON
DISTRICTficft&E&JWGE

Deputy Cle*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
//

Decision,

postage

day of April, 1989:

James B. Lee
Kent W. Winterholler
David R. Bird
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 S. State, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Bill Thomas Peters
Special Deputy Salt Lake and Tooele
County Attorney
Attorney for Defendants Monson
and Pendleton
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ralph Finlayson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant Tax Comm.
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

prepaid,

to

the
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Exhibit B

RLE9DiS?7XT5SS]*7
Third JUJ:C*CJ D._t;:ct

JUL 1 2 1989
JAMES B. LEE (A1919)
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER (3525)
MAXWELL A. MILLER (A2264)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES
(USA) INC., and HERCULES,
INCORPORATED,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINAL
ORDER AND CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the
Utah State Tax Commission,
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO,
Utah State Tax Commissioner,
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN,
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T.
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake
County Treasurer; and GRANT L.
PENDLETON, Tooele County
Treasurer,

Civil No. 88-3457
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Before the Court are reciprocal motions for partial
summary judgment and other related reciprocal motions to strike

various supporting affidavits and attached exhibits.

The parties

filed

counsel

extensive memoranda,

argued orally.

appeared

through

their

Plaintiffs appeared by and through their attor-

neys, Maxwell A. Miller and Kent W. Winterholler.
appeared

by

and

and

through

their

attorneys,

Bill

Defendants

Thomas

Peters,

special Deputy Salt Lake County and Tooele County attorney, and
Karl Hendricksen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney.
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and
having considered
parties,

issued

legal authorities and memoranda
its

Memorandum

motions on April 11, 1989.
and

being

otherwise

fully

Decision

on

the

filed by the
above-stated

Based on that Memorandum Decision,
advised

in the premises,

the

Court

hereby enters the following Summary Judgment and Final Order.
1.

The Court rules that plaintiffs lack standing to

contest the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987)
under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
2.
(1987)

is

concern,

in
and

The Court

rules

furtherance
as

such,

of

is

that Utah Code Ann. $ 17-19-15
resolving

a matter

constitutional

under

of

statewide

Article,

XIII

Section 5 of the Utah Constitution.
3.

The

Court

rules

that

the

revenue

distribution

aspect of the funding mechanism established by Utah Code Ann. S
17-19-15

(1987) does not mandate

revenue sharing between coun-

ties, and, therefore, does not violate that provision of Article
XIII, Section 5 which permits only consensual revenue sharing.
-2-

4.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies plain-

tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
5.
Judgment

as

The Court
it pertains

grants defendants' Motion
to the constitutionality

for

Summary

of Utah Code

Ann. S 17-19-15 (1987) under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution.
6.

The Court

denies defendants' Motion

for

Summary

Judgment as it pertains to plaintiffs' Second, Third and Fourth
Causes of Action.
7.

The Court denies the parties' respective motions

8.

The Court dismisses plaintiffs' Amended Complaint,

to strike.

with respect to its First Cause of Action, with prejudice.
Based

upon

Order, and pursuant

the

foregoing

Summary

to Rule 54(b) of

Judgment

and

Final

the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Court makes the following Certification.
9.

The Court rules that there are multiple parties in

the present action and that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint raises
multiple claims.
10.
herein

The Court rules that the Summary Judgment entered

is a final order, wholly disposes of plaintiffs' First

Cause of Action, and would be appealable but for the presence of
plaintiffs' remaining claims.

-3-

11.

The Court determines and certifies that there is

no just reason to delay the plaintiffs from taking an appeal from
the present Summary Judgment and Final Order.
DATED this

day of May, 1989.
<Y THE COURT:

HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Third District Court Judge
Tax Division
239:050589A

-4-
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES
(USA) INC., and HERCULES,
INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

-vsTHE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the
Utah State Tax Commission
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO,
Utah State Tax Commissioner,
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN,
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T.
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake
County Treasurer; and GRANT L.
PENDLETON, Tooele County
Treasurer,

Civil No.

88-3457

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
Arthur L. Monson, Salt Lake County Treasurer, and
Grant L. Pendleton, Tooele County Treasurer, by and through

their attorney, submit the following Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Response to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commis-

sion in assessing certain multi-county or specifically designated properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished
in the State of Utah through local county officials in each of
the twenty-nine counties.

To suggest, however, that because

functions are reposed within the statutory portfolios of locally
elected officials and financed partially or totally by county
general fund revenues ignores the significant historical role
which the State Legislature and State Tax Commission have played
in all local assessment issues.

Article XIII, Section 11,

Constitution of Utah, establishes a State Tax Commission and
provides specifically that:
"under such regulations in such cases and
within such limitations as the Legislature may
prescribe it shall review proposed bond
issues, revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment and
valuation of property within the counties."
(Emphasis added.)
The same constitutional provision gives the State Tax
Commission power to regulate and control local County Boards of
Equalization and local elected officials with respect to taxation matters.

Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210, 1953, as amended,
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grants sweeping control to the Tax Commission over local county
taxing matters.

Specifically, it may "adopt rules and pol-

icies, ••to govern county boards and officers in the performance
of any duty relating to assessment, equalization and collection
of taxes" [§59-1-210(3)], "prescribe the use of forms relating
to the assessment of property and the equalization of those
assessments" [§59-1-210(4)], and "administer and supervise the
tax laws of the state" [§59-1-210(5)].

Additionally it may:

"exercise general supervision over assessors
and county boards of equalization and over
other county officers in the performance of
their duties relating to the assessment of
property and collection of taxes so that all
assessments of property are just and equal,
according to fair market value, and that the
tax burden is distributed without favor or
discrimination" [§59-1-210(7)] .
It may "confer with, advise and direct county treasurers, assessors and other county officers in matters relating to
the assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210(9)].

Finally, to enforce its

complete supervisory control over the local property tax process
it may "cause complaints to be made in the proper court seeking
removal from office of assessors, auditors, members of county
boards and other assessing, taxing, or disbursing officers who
are

guilty

of

[§59-1-210(12)].

official

misconduct

or

neglect

of duty"

As part of its investigative responsibility to

the Commission is charged with the power to:
"investigate and direct the work and methods
of local assessors and other officials in the

3

assessment, equalization, and taxation of
property, and to ascertain whether the law
requiring the assessment of all property not
exempt from taxation, and the collection of
taxes, have been properly administered and
enforced." [§59-1-210(19)].
This comprehensive grant of regulatory authority and
state control over all assessment and collection practices
within the counties of the State is also evidenced by several
specific statutory enactments relating to the performance of
those duties.

Chapter 2 of Title 59, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as

amended) provides a comprehensive statutory framework with
regard to time frames, procedures, standards and methods under
which local assessors, treasurers, auditors, and County Boards
of Equalization must function.

The Legislature and Tax Commis-

sion have, to a large degree, completely assume control of the
local administration of the property tax system.
Consistent with the Constitutional requirement for the
fair, equitable and accurate assessment of all property in the
State (Utah Const. Art. XIII §3) , the Tax Commission has been
constitutionally and statutorily mandated

to equalize the

valuations of the various counties for purposes of guaranteeing
equitable assessment levels in financing the Uniform School
Fund.

The revenues of that fund are derived to a large degree

from a uniform statewide tax levy imposed by local school
districts.

To further state equalization and uniformity of

assessment, the Utah State Legislature, in 1969, established
comprehensive programs of assessor certification and examination
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and a statewide re-appraisal program with costs to be shared
between counties and the State Tax Commission.

This program was

designed to provide for re-appraisal of all taxable property in
each county every five years on a county-by-county basis.

The

Legislature also implemented a program of personal property
auditing conducted by the State Tax Commission with cost sharing
by the counties.

See generally, Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 179,

Section 1 through 6, [Codified as Utah Code Ann. §59-5-106
through 111 (1953, as amended)].
In 1981, the re-appraisal program created in 1969 was
repealed by the Utah State Legislature, (Laws of Utah 1981,
Chapter 233, Section 2.)

In its place was substituted a compre-

hensive program of sales-assessment ratio studies to be conducted by the State Tax Commission.

The provisions relating to

certification of county assessors, education and training
programs conducted by the Tax Commission, personal property
audits and assessment-sales ratio studies are currently codified
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-701 through 705 (1953, as amended.)
With respect to the assessment-sales ratio responsibility of the
State Tax Commission, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-704 (1953, as amended) provides, in pertinent part, that upon completion of the
study by the Tax Commission:
"The Commission shall before the fourth
Tuesday of November of each even numbered year
beginning in 1984 order each county to adjust
or factor its assessment rates using the most
current studies so that the assessment rate in
each county is in accordance with that

5

prescribed in §59-2-103.
Adjustment or
factoring may include an entire county,
geological areas within a county, and separate
classes or property. The Commission shall
also order corrective action where significant
value deviations occur." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly as part of the comprehensive State policy
with respect to equal and uniform assessments, the Tax Commission has been given authority to order adjustments to values and
even order corrective action (re-appraisal) when significant
value deviations occur.
Finally, as part of its effort to guarantee accuracy
of assessment for purposes of equality within the equalized tax
levy supporting the Uniform School Fund, the Legislature in 1977
(Laws of Utah, 1977, Chapter 22, Sections 1 through 4) provided
that uniform minimum standards for real property plat maps used
by counties for property tax assessments would be established by
a separate committee chaired by a member of the State Tax
Commission.

The statutes provide that all plat maps prepared by

local elected county recorders and assessors must conform to
those standards and that the counties would be reimbursed for
the cost of correcting existing plats.

The importance of this

activity and its relevance to the support of the Uniform School
Fund were deemed sufficient to justify the enactment of Utah
Code Ann. §59-5-114, now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-318
(1952, as amended), which stated:
Cost of preparation of revised plats are to be
borne by the Commission and appropriated from
the Uniform School fund to the Property Tax
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Division of the Commission for distribution to
the various counties...(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Legislature clearly established that equality of assessment between counties was of such statewide concern
that an equalized statewide levy should be used to pay for the
services.

This financing mechanism is identical to that chal-

lenged by the plaintiffs in the instant case.
The Act presented for the court's review is the
culmination of five years concerted legislative activity and
litigation of cities, school districts and counties.

See

generally Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030
(Utah 1983) , and Boards of Education of Granite, Murray and Salt
Lake School Districts v. Salt Lake County Commission, et al.,
Appeal No. 19814 (Decided February 1, 1988).

In an attempt to

resolve and/or eliminate continuing litigation over the apportionment of the costs of assessing, collecting and distributing
property taxes, the statewide financing mechanism currently
under attack in the instant case was duly enacted by the Utah
State Legislature as S.B. 151.

The method of financing an

effective and economic statewide system of property tax assessment, collection and distribution was closely modeled on the
financing mechanism for the State supported minimum school
program (Uniform School Fund).

See Utah Code Ann. §53-7-1 et

seq. (1953, as amended.)
Under the uniform statewide tax administration levy,
local county governing bodies established budgets for assessing,
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collecting and distributing property taxes, categorized those
costs in the uniform budgeting categories adopted by rule by the
State Auditor, and imposed as a local levy a uniform statewide
tax rate sufficient to finance the aggregated budgets submitted
by the 29 counties.

If, in any county, the levy for tax admin-

istration purposes generated an amount in excess of the amount
budgeted by the Board of County Commissioners for that county,
the excess funds were to be transmitted to the State Treasurer
for re-distribution to counties like Tooele County where the tax
rate was insufficient to generate the aimount required for the
tax administration system.

County commissions were free to

budget and expend whatever funds they deemed necessary to
accomplish the operation of the property tax administration
system.

In the event the expenditures were not within one of

the uniform categories adopted and approved by the State Auditor, the County Commission retained the authority to provide for
the expenditure from other county revenues.
The utilization of an equalized statewide levy approved during the 1986 general legislative session was a deviation from the previous authority of each county to levy a
separate tax

for the cost of assessing, collecting and dis-

tributing property taxes.

The equalized levy was in specific

recognition of the significant differences in property tax
valuation throughout the 29 counties.

Many counties such as

Tooele County, possess insufficient tax base to fully fund the
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cost of property tax assessment, collection and distribution
with the tax rate authorized by the Legislature for that purpose.

The utilization of an equalized tax rate was an attempt

to minimize the negative impact of this disparity in taxing
capability.

As a solution it received the unanimous support of

the cities, counties and school districts which are three major
groups which had previously been involved in litigation over
these same issues (see Affidavit attached hereto).
It is against this background that the present Act,
codified as Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 (1953, as amended), must be
analyzed.

The present Act is the Legislature^ considered

solution to the need for an equalized, efficient mechanism to
pay for the costs of a statewide property tax assessment,
collection and distribution system.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFFS' ERRONEOUS ASSERTION,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NOT HELD S.B. 151 TO
BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Plaintiffs, in their Amended Complaint at paragraph
25 make the following assertion:
"...the Utah Attorney General has rendered an
opinion holding S.B. 151, Utah Code Annotated
§17-15-19, is unconstitutional..."

Q

At

page

24

and

25

of

following statement is made:

Plaintiffs'

Memorandum

the

"Indeed, the Attorney General's

analysis of the Act does not claim that the language of the Act
or the procedures outlined therein are so vague and ambiguous
that the Court can construe them so as to save them from being
declared unconstitutional,"
Much

of

Plaintiffs'

Complaint

and

Memorandum

are

premised upon the assertion that the Attorney General has held
the Act

to be unconstitutional.

That

position

is not only

without merit, but is an exaggeration or a misrepresentation.
The opinion does not "hold" S.B. 151 to be unconstitutional.

Indeed, Plaintiffs' attorney Max Miller was in Court

on September 1, 1988, when the author of the opinion, Ralph L.
Finlayson, Assistant Attorney General, made an appearance in
the case before Judge Tibbs where the constitutionality of the
same statute was being argued.
General with

regard

The position of the Attorney

to the statute

and

its opinion was set

forth in a letter in said proceedings to the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, District Court Judge, wherein it is stated:
"The counties are vigorously and adequately
representing the interest in upholding the
statute at issue. The Attorney General has
provided an opinion on the central issue
involved, which opinion speaks for itself.
The opinion is already a part of the Court
record and is hereby tendered to assist in
addressing the issue.
The opinion is an
analysis that does not purport to bind the
Court and is not an unequivocal declaration of
constitutionality
or
unconstitutionality."
(Emphasis supplied.) See Exhibit "A", letter
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of Ralph L. Finlayson to The Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, dated August 26, 1988.
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs1 mis-characterization

is

correct,

Plaintiff

cites

no

authority

proposition that an opinion by the Attorney General

for

the

can rule

an act of the legislature to be unconstitutional and have that
determination by binding upon the Courts.
doctrine of the separation of powers

Indeed, under the

that determination has

been given, exclusively to the judicial branch of government,
not the executive branch*

The Courts, not the Attorney General

determine constitutionality of statutes.
tiffs' Complaint, Memorandum

and

To the extent Plain-

argument

are premised

upon

such an assertion they should be disregarded as being totally
without merit.

POINT II
SENATE BILL NO. 151, (CODIFIED AT UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §17-19-15, DULY ENACTED BY THE 1986
LEGISLATURE, IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL AS A
VALID
LEGISLATIVE
ENACTMENT
DESIGNED
TO
PROMOTE
EFFICIENT
STATEWIDE
PROPERTY
TAX
ASSESSMENT, COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION.
The plaintiffs seek to have this Court find the Act
violative of various provisions of the United States and Utah
Constitutions.
judicial

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed

restraint

in

finding

any

particular force to tax statutes."

duly

legislative

Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan

County, 681 P.2d 184, 190-191 (Utah, 1984).
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enacted

It is also presumed

that all legislative enactments are the result of the considered
opinions of the state's duly elected and representative lawmakers.

To find any statute unconstitutional, the court must

find that no reasonable reading of the statute permits a finding
of constitutionality.

[The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285

P. 1001, 1004 (Utah, 1930)].

If any fair reading of the statute

permits a constitutional interpretation, the Court must uphold
it.

It is against this strong presumption that the statutory

scheme discussed below must be analyzed,,

POINT III
THE ACT AND THE TAX LEVY IMPOSED THEREUNDER
ARE IN FURTHERANCE OF A STATEWIDE PUBLIC
PURPOSE AND THUS DO NOT VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XIII, §5.
Plaintiffs claim the Act violates Utah Const. Art.
XIII, §5 by allowing the Legislature to impose taxes for County
purposes, by granting the State Auditor excessive control over
local budgetary
property

tax

decisions

revenues

and by

with

each

forcing Counties
other.

to share

In construing

the

statute it must be read so as to give effect to the Legislative
purpose utilizing the plain meaning of the statutory language.
The statute under attack is a funding mechanism designed, after
many years and several attempts to achieve a reasonable, efficient and equalized system of paying for the costs of assessing,
collecting and distributing property taxes.

The Act unequivo-

cally provides that "to promote appraisal and equalization...and
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effective

collection

or property

tax proceeds," proper

offi-

cials , based upon reasonable economic data and assumptions, must
levy

a tax uniformly

statewide.

As has

been

previously

set

forth for this Court's consideration, the mechanism employed by
this Act is not an aberration.
statewide

concerns

through

Other statutes resolve similar

funding mechanisms

revenues between local entities.

that reallocate

As an example, the statewide

Uniform School Fund levy also appears as a local levy on property

tax

notices.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§53-7-17,

§53-7-18,

and

§59-2-904 (1953, as amended).
Plaintiffs' challenges to the Act rely extensively on
several Utah Supreme
1936.

Court decisions

issued between

State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66).1061

1901 and

(1901); State

v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P.337 (1904); Bailey v. VanDyke, 66
Utah 184, 240 P.242 (1925); The Best Foods v. Christensen, 285
P.1001

(Utah 1930); Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 (Utah

1936) .

These early cases are distinguishable from the case at

bar both

factually and legally.

Additionally, several recent

cases however have significantly diminished the relevance of the
earlier authority in assessing the constitutionality of funding
mechanisms

authorized

interest—especially
involved.

by
where

the

Legislature

matters

of

as

in

statewide

the

public

concern

Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d

499

are
(Utah

1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P. 2d
1339

(Utah

1979); U.T.F.C. V. Wilkinson, 723 P. 2d

13

406

(Utah

1986).

See also A, Lynn Jr., Financing Modernized and unmod-

ernized

Local Government

L.REV.30,

in the Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah

Under this latter line of cases, the funding mecha-

nism established by the Act is clearly constitutional.

Finally,

the clear distinctions between the statutory mechanism set out
in the Act support validation even under the earlier strict
construction of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5.
In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P.1061 (1901)
the Legislature imposed upon counties the requirement of hiring
and paying a pre-selected fruit tree inspector.

This employee

performed duties under the direction of the state board of
horticulture and had the unrestricted authority to hire deputies.

In striking down the Act, the Court held that it imper-

missibly usurped county administrative ciuthority, created county
debt without county consent, violated the constitutional prohibition against imposing a local tax for the solely local purpose, lacked uniformity of operation, and lacked a state purpose.
review.

There was no statement of state purpose in the act under
The Court recognized the state possessed clear author-

ity to impose taxes for state purposes.

Ijd. at 1062.

Substantial differences exist between the current Act
and the scheme addressed by the Standford court.

In the instant

case, county employees, subject to the control of county officials, continue to perform their statutorily imposed responsibilities.

Budgets

and

expenditures
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remain

under

county

control.
funding
purpose.

Tax rates are applied uniformly statewide, and the
mechanism
Uniform

furthers

a comprehensive

and efficient property

statewide

public

tax assessment and

collection were the same goals sought by the earlier state
funded reappraisal and assessment plat review programs and are
the precise public policy objectives articulated by the legislature in the body of the current act.
Three years later, the Court again considered

the

application of Article XIII Section 5 to a legislative act. In
State v. Eldredge, 76 P.337 (Utah 1904), the Legislature authorized the State Board of Equalization to assess or value
certain property situated wholly within one county.
was constitutionally vested in county officials.

This duty

That portion

of the statute authorizing state assessment or valuation of
property

situated

or operated

severed or voided.

wholly within one county was

No fair reading permitted upholding that

portion in light of the specific Constitutional limitation of
Utah Cost. Art. XIII, §11.

It should be noted that the consti-

tutional provision relied upon by the Court has been amended
three times since the 1904 decision.

The constitutional sepa-

ration of state and local functions has been abolished and the
clear supervisory control of the State Tax Commission has been
reinforced.

In fact, much of the litany of potential abuse

cited by the Eldredge Court (and by Plaintiffs) is now constitutionally

sanctioned

by

express
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constitutional

language.

Eldredge

thus

provides

little

guidance

to

this

Court

in

determining questions of state purpose and state taxation•

In

the case at hand, the Act can be read fairly without finding
clear violations to Article XIII, Section 5 or Article XIII,
Section 11 •

The duties and functions of each public official

set forth in the Act come within and are consistent with the
respective statutorily permitted duties for each such public
position.

(See, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210, general powers and

duties of State Tax Commission; Utah Code Ann. §17-5-52, -53,
-54, duties of Board of County Commissioners; Utah Code Ann.
§67-3-1, general functions and duties of State Auditor; Utah
Code Ann. §67-4-1, general duties of State Treasurer.)
In 1925 the Court again considered an Article XIII
Section 5 challenge to a law providing for agricultural extension services throughout the state.

In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 2 40

P.454 (Utah 1925), the Court upheld a law authorizing county
commissions to enter contracts for state agricultural extension
services with the local taxes.
Certain distinctions between Bailey and the present
case

should

issues.

be noted

for

proper

understanding

of the real

In Bailey, local governments could, at their option

enter into contracts for agricultural extension services.

A

local decision supported by a local tax would result; no section
of the Constitution was violated.

The plaintiffs contend that

Bailey would prohibit requiring that taxes be imposed to fund
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the

administration

of

the property

tax

system.

Such

a con-

tention ignores the statewide public purpose addressed by the
Act.

In the present case, a legislatively

defined

statewide

concern required a statewide remedy and it is well settled that
the

Legislature

in

furtherance

of

a

statewide

require the imposition of local tax levies.

purpose

may

Such is the case

with the analogous Uniform School Fund levy described above.
Plaintiffs

also

County, 63 P. 2d 259

seek

support

(Utah 1936.)

in

Smith

v.

Carbon

The Act under review by the

Smith Court involved the imposition by county clerks of probate
fees graduated

according

to the size of the estate.

At the

outset it must be noted that Smith was not an Article XIII, §5
case.
dicta.

The only reference to that provision is a passing one—in
The case

largely

revolved

charge was a "fee" or a "tax."
a

around whether

the probate

The Court concluded that it was

"tax1 which, because of its graduated nature, violated the

uniform and equal provisions.

As the Article XIII §5 issues

were not briefed the Court didn't address them.
is of

little

authority

for

support

to the Plaintiffs

sustaining

the

power

of

since
the

Thus the case
there is clear

State

to

impose

burdens on local government and require the imposition of taxes
to pay

for them.

P.1001-1004

The

Best

Foods, Inc. v. Christensen,

2 85

(Utah 1930.)

Finally, plaintiffs rely on The Best Foods, Inc. v.
Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the
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current Act

intrudes

self-government.

impermissibly

into

the right of local

In Best Foods, a legislative requirement that

local officials grant and sell permits prior to allowing commercial trade of oleomargarine was upheld even though the local
governments were directed to charge and keep the administrative
fees allowed.
local

While the Court stated that the "very essence of

self-government/' was

the

collect and control revenues.

power

of municipalities

to

Id., at 1003, it upheld the act

first stating clearly the rule that a statute must be found
constitutional

if

susceptible

to

a

valid

interpretation.

Second, the Court found that the Legislature acted well within
its power in imposing a duty on local governments to assist the
state in enforcing the Act and furthering a statewide purpose.
Id. at 1004.

The Court also noted that the Legislature may,

under settled authority, impose on counties the duty to impose
taxes other than for its own purposes.

Ld. at 1004.

This

reasoning applies with equal force in the instant case where
property tax administration has been the subject of extensive
legislative

control

and

state

financial

and

administrative

involvement.
While these early decisions by the Utah Supreme Court
strictly construed the constitutional restriction on the Legislature vis-a-vis local governments1 sovereignty, the Court has
taken a far more pragmatic approach in later years.

These later

cases stress the importance of granting deference to legislative
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enactments

responding

to

statewide

concerns,

even

when

the

concerns may initially appear as localized issues.
In Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah
1975) the Court considered the Article XIII Section 5 challenge
to

the

Utah

Neighborhood

alleged

that

the

state's

Development
diversion

of

Act,

Plaintiffs

locally

had

assessed

and

collected property taxes to a local redevelopment agency's use
was

unconstitutional*

Finding

the

act

to

have

a

statewide

purpose, the facial appearance of local benefits accruing to an
agency controlled by a Board of Directors composed of the Salt
Lake City Council occurring at the instance of a legislative act
was not controlling.

To respond to a statewide concern, blight-

ed areas, "the law is well settled that in exercising the powers
of

the

state

the

Legislature

may

require

the

revenue

of

a

municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other
than that for which the taxes were levied."

Ld. at 504.

The holding in Tribe is important to the present case
because

it properly recognizes the Legislature's

recognize

a legitimate

statewide purpose

authority to

(i.e., respectively,

rid localities on a statewide basis of blighted areas, Tribe;
and create an efficient statewide assessment
distribution

mechanism

of

all

property

, collection and

tax proceeds

for

the

benefit of all, the instant case), and the concomitant authority
to require imposition of a tax for or the diversion of local
revenue to that identified specific statewide purpose.
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Following Tribe, in Salt Lake County v. Murray City
Redevelopment,

598 P.2d

1339

(Utah

2979),

this Court again

upheld the Utah Neighborhood Redevelopment Act and found the
diversion of locally assessed taxes to the Murray City project's
use as a proper exercise of the state's power to tax for the
benefit of the public at large.

The Salt Lake County Court took

the opportunity to reaffirm its earlier conclusions in Tribe.
The Legislature is empowered to redirect the tax revenues of
local governments for purposes it has concluded are statewide
concerns.

Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Plain-

tiff Salt Lake County was not deprived of its taxes to the sole
benefit of Murray City.

The County's

"power to assess and

collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation" remained
intact.

Ici. at 1343.
These two recent cases clearly demonstrate the Court's

approval of taxing mechanisms created by the Legislature to
resolve identified statewide concerns such as that faced in the
present case.

Even earlier cases relied on by the plaintiffs

reference the principle of state purpose as justification for
legislatively imposed taxes or diversions of locally assessed
taxes.

These

later cases clearly note the overriding state

purpose and uphold the legislative acts satisfying that definition.

There is no intimation by the earlier courts that if in

fact a statewide purpose were at issue that the acts would not
have been upheld.
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The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

recently

and

succinctly

stated the roles of the judiciary and the Legislature relative
to public purpose enactments.
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in
lav/ making requires that the judiciary not
interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy
considerations and the legislative
scheme
employs reasonable means to effectuate a
legitimate objective.
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d

406, 412

(Utah 1986), citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).
Continuing in this narrative, the UTFC Court, citing with favor
its opinion in Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184
(Utah 1984) states:
[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed constitutional, especially when dealing with economic matters based on factual assumptions. It
is only when a legislative determination of
public purpose is so clearly in error as to be
capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary
should upset it. Allen v. Tooele, supra.
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson,
723 P.2d 406, 412-413 (Utah 1986).
And finally, the Court described the nature of public purpose.
What is public purpose varies and changes with
the times.
In 1890, it was held that the
purchasing and operating of an electrical
distribution system to supply electricity to
homes was not a public purpose. Maudlin v.
City Council of Greenville, 33 S.C. 1, 11 S.E.
434 (1890) . In contrast, in the past twelve
years we have found public purpose in industrial development by a county, Allen v. Tooele
County, supra; eradication of urban blight by
a quasi-municipal corporation, Tribe v. Salt
Lake City; and the providing of funds for lowand moderate-income housing by a state agency.
Utah Housing Finance v. Smart, supra.
We
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cannot say in the face of those precedents
that the stimulation of Utah's economy and the
creation of employment is not a legitimate
public purpose.
It is closely related to
industrial development and not different in
kind.
Whatever our private views on the
matter might be, we must concede that the
Legislature's determination that a public
benefit would result was within its latitude.
IdL at 413.
The Plaintiffs, at great length, reiterate that the
uniform levy to defray the costs of collecting and assessing
property taxes created pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§17-19-15

(Supp. 1°88) constitutes a legislative imposition of a local tax
for purely local purposes in violation of Utah Const. Art. XIII,
§5.

Ignoring the long history of State involvement and super-

vision over the property tax assessment and collection process,
they base their argument almost exclusively upon the fact that
assessment and collection functions are performed by County
elected officials.

The argument is simply that if County

officials perform these services, they must be County purposes
and accordingly Utah Constitution, Article XIII, §5 must be
violated.

Such an argument ignores the historical development

of counties, the relationship of counties to the State and the
dual obligations of County officials in performing both State
and purely local functions.
visions of the State.

In Utah, counties are legal subdi-

Utah Const. Art. XI, §1.

organized and created by general law.

They are

Utah Const. Art. XI, §4.

They are not municipal corporations of purely local character as
defined in Utah Const. Art. XI, §5.

22

This distinction is

important in the instant case since the Utah Supreme Court in
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 560, 564 (Utah 1913)
defined a "local purpose" for Article XIII §5 analysis as one
"for the public good, and not for a private purpose; that such
purpose is not one which pertains to the corporate powers or
interests of Salt Lake City."

The critical question is then

whether purely local self-government is affected.

There, as in

the instant case, "the state, ...simply calls upon its agencies,
the counties, and the cities to assist in discharging a public
duty which in no way affects local self-government."

Id. at 564

Counties, as legal subdivisions of the State act as instrumentalities of the State in effecting State purposes.

The State uses

the County as its agent in the discharge of the State's functions and duties.

Specific examples of this role are found

throughout Title 17, Utah Code Annotated.
all process when the State is a party.
Anno.

(19 53 as amended.)

Sheriffs must serve
§17-22-26, Utah Code

County Attorneys must conduct on

behalf of the State all prosecutions for public offenses within
counties.

They must attend to all legal business required by

the Attorney General, without charge, when the interests of the
State are involved.

§17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended.)

County Assessors, in cooperation with and under the supervision
of the State Tax Commission, must perform all the duties mandated by Tax Commission Rule, the Legislature or the Constitution.
Utah Const., Art. XIII, §11, and §17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953
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as amended.)

Based upon this mix of delegated State respon-

sibility and the County quasi-municipal police powers over
purely

local

matters

Plaintiffs

err

in

suggesting

an

interpretation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 that ignores these
differences.

The

State of

Utah

has

a

long

history

of

involvement in and supervision over property tax assessment and
collection matters.

(Defendants Memorandum pp. 1-9). The State

has paid for many of the local assessment functions.
as 1917 the State, with State general
obligated

to pay

a proportionate

As early

fund revenues, was

share of the costs of

collecting and assessing property taxes,,

Compiled Laws of Utah,

1917, §1561, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, §19-16-16, and
§19-16-16 Utah Code Ann. 1943.
provided "the sum

Specifically, those statutes

(of the assessing and collection costs) so

apportioned to the state and the state school funds shall be
borne and paid by the state, ..."

Clearly, the state could not

legally expend state funds unless the expenditures were for
state purposes.
It is settled law in this State, as it is all jurisdictions throughout the Country, that the Legislature possesses
the authority to require local governments to impose taxes or
spend funds raised by taxes to effect state-wise purposes.
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d
1339, 1343

(Utah 1979).

Plaintiffs choose to ignore this
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mandatory aspect of Tribe and Salt Lake County.

Also ignored is

the simple reality that counties annually budget, levy, and
expend millions of dollars in the performance of duties mandated
by the State Legislature as part of comprehensive Legislative
schemes for effecting State policy.

State offenses are pros-

ecuted, state Courts are supported, state statute violators are
incarcerated, and state standards for assessing and collecting
property taxes are complied with, all by County officials, all
with local property tax dollars, and all pursuant to comprehensive State mandated policies.

As noted in a leading treatise on

County law, ... Everywhere, even in states having the aforementioned constitutional clause, (referring to a constitutional
provision identical to Article XIII, §5 of Utah Constitution),
it is agreed that state legislatures can impose taxes upon
counties for state purposes and can compel counties to spend for
such purposes even though taxation will be required.
supplied.)

(Emphasis

Antieau, Local Governmental Law, §41.07.
Additionally,

uniform

and

equitable

property

tax

assessment, collection and distribution has been a matter of
general public concern since statehood.

Equal and uniform

assessment is required by the Constitution.

The state has borne

the cost of statewide reappraisal programs.

Equalized levies

have paid for the development of local property assessment plat
naps.
tration

The timing, sequencing, and performance of tax adminisduties

by

County

officials
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are

all

subject

to

constitutional, statutory, and administrative control by the
state.

To suggest that the current Act violates local self-

government or constitutes legislative imposition of a tax for
local purposes ignores both history and reality.

The Act is in

furtherance of resolving a matter of statewide concern and as
such is constitutional under all the cases which have interpreted Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5.

In conclusion, the Plaintiffs1

claims cannot overcome the presumption of constitutionality and
the clear presence of a comprehensive state purpose.

POINT IV
THE ACT'S REVENUE SHARING PROVISIONS DO NOT
VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. XIII, §5.
Plaintiffs

contend

that

the

revenue

redistribution

aspect of the funding mechanism established by the Act violates
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5, by mandating revenue sharing between
the counties.

Plaintiffs' argument is that the revenue sharing

allowed under that constitutional provision is a voluntary act
engaged in by counties which may not be imposed upon counties by
the Legislature.

As discussed above, the revenue redistribution

formula set out in the Act is not an anomaly under Utah law.

It

is similar in its operation to that created by the Legislature
for funding the mandated minimum school program [see Utah Code
Ann. §53-7-1 et seq. (1953, as amended)], or distributing local
sales and use tax revenue.

As part of a comprehensive statewide

approach to funding the property tax administration system the
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revenue redistribution aspects of the Act are clearly consistent
with those approved by the Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City
Corp, , 540 P. 2d 499 (Utah 1975) and Salt Lake County v. Murray
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d

1339

(Utah 1979).

In each of those

cases taxes properly levied by taxing entities within Salt Lake
County were partially diverted to a redevelopment agency for the
purpose of alleviating the statewide problem of blighted areas.
In the present case, counties which generate proceeds in excess
of their budgeted amounts as a result of the uniform statewide
tax administration

levy have those excess funds diverted to

other counties in furtherance of funding programs leading to
statewide

uniformity

of

assessment

and

valuation.

Such a

program does not necessarily constitute revenue sharing between
the counties, but merely

a statewide

matter of statewide concern.

funding approach to a

According, Utah Cost. Art. XIII §5

is irrelevant to the discussion.
Even

assuming

arguendo

that

the

funding mechanism

prescribed by the Act constitutes revenue sharing between the
counties, plaintiffs' challenge to the Act on that basis must
fail

for

several

reasons.

First,

if

the

Act

only

allows

voluntary revenue sharing, the aggrieved parties are not the
plaintiffs
sharing.

but

those

Plaintiffs

counties
lack

which

standing

object

to assert

to

the

revenue

the claims on

behalf of the counties and accordingly their claim should be
dismissed.

Second, the clear factual evidence as set out in the
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Affidavit of Mr. Gardner and the joint statement of the Utah
Association of Counties, Utah League of Cities and Towns and
Utah School Boards Association, clearly establish that the Act
was

supported

by

the

counties

at

the

time

of

its

passage.

Subsequently the Utah Association of Counties, by resolution of
all its membership, or the executive
speak

for

endorsed

it,

S.B.

has,

on

two

committee

separate

authorized

occasions

to

specifically

151 including the funding mechanism

established

thereunder.

Finally,

of

Commissioners

and

the

County

Utah

Councils

Association
representing

the

County
governing

bodies of all 29 counties of the State has unanimously endorsed
the Act with
attempt

to

its revenue

amend

or

sharing

repeal

it.

provisions
To

assert

and opposed
that

the

any

revenue

sharing portions of the Act are contrary to the wishes of the
counties

ignores

reality.

Third,

assuming

further

that

the

financing mechanism does constitute involuntary revenue sharing,
Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, is silent on the question of whether
the State may re-distribute revenue when a statewide purpose is
involved.

The amendment of Utah Const. Art. XIII

§5 was to

allow voluntary horizontal revenue sharing (Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 22) .
sis"

prepared

In support Plaintiff cites the "Impartial Analyfor

the

1982 Voter

Information

Amendment and the Analysis speak for themselves.
allows

local governments to voluntarily

Pamphlet.

The

The Amendment

share their revenues.

It is silent as to whether the legislature is prohibited from
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diverting or reallocating revenues between local subdivisions.
The

real

anywhere

question
in

that

surrounding
amendment

the

1983

exists

amendment

a prohibition

is

whether

against

the

Legislature imposing a tax or requiring revenue sharing for a
state purpose.

Defendants submit there is not.

The amendment

is silent on that issue and Plaintiff should not be allowed to
create from whole cloth a non-existent Constitutional prohibition.
lative

Barring such a constitutional prohibition against legisaction, Utah

Const. Art. VI

§1 clearly

vests

in the

Legislature of the State of Utah all authority to legislate on
matters of statewide concern.

Kimball v. City of Grantsville,

et al., 57 P.l, 5 (Utah 1899); State ex rel. Nicholes v. Cherry,
Judge, 60 P. 1103

(Utah 1900); Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d

530, 534, 535 (Utah 1935) .
In

summary,

plaintiffs1

Utah

Const. Art. XIII,

§5

challenge to the Act as "involuntary revenue sharing" must fail.
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge a provision that may only
be challenged by the affected governmental entities to wit, the
counties and, second, the record adequately supports that the
revenue sharing of the Act is fully supported and endorsed by
all 29 counties.
Simply

stated,

Utah

Const. Art.

XIII

§5

does

not

prohibit the diversion of local revenues to effect a statewide
purpose (Tribe and Salt Lake County, supra.).

Unless prohibited

by the Constitution, the power to legislate on matters of State

29

concern is vested in the Legislature.

Utah Const. Art. VI §1.

The 1983 amendment to Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, allowing voluntary revenue sharing between local governments is silent and
does not specifically prohibit the State from creating funding
mechanisms, even including horizontal revenue sharing, when a
statewide

purpose

is involved.

Accordingly, Utah Code Ann.

§17-19-15, is a legitimate exercise of the reserved power of the
Legislature found in Utah Const. Art. VI §1 and is not prohibited by Utah Const. Art. XIII §5.

POINT V.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR
"REVENUE SHARING" AND THE ROLES OF THE STATE
AUDITOR, TREASURER AND TAX COMMISSION ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE, THE IMPOSITION
OF A TAX LEVY TO DEFRAY THE COSTS OF ADMINISTERING THE PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IN EACH COUNTY
IS SEVERABLE AND MUST BE UPHELD.
Plaintiffs' challenge the entire funding mechanism by
which local counties defray the costs of assessing, collecting
and distributing property taxes.

Those costs total approximate-

ly $23 million dollars per year statewide in all of Utah's
counties.

That

amount

is

currently

available

to

counties

through the uniform statewide levy challenged by the plaintiffs
and

additional

levies

reappraisal purposes.

authorized

by

the

statute

for

local

Assuming for purposes of argument that

the plaintiffs were to prevail on their challenge to the constitutionality of the Act, the issue must be addressed

^n

as to

whether

the imposition, on a county by county basis, of a

separate tax to defray the costs of administering the property
tax system is severable and can thus be sustained.

The Utah

Supreme Court has addressed the issue of severability in several
cases where a portion of a legislative act could not survive
constitutional review even given the presumption of validity.
The Court held in Salt Lake City v. The International Association of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) "[severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is primarily
a matter of legislative intent."

Assuming this Court were to

find any portion of the Act under challenge invalid, the legislative history leading to the Act and the Act itself clearly
permit the remaining portions
accomplishing
drafted.

The

the

(the tax levy) to stand, thus

legitimate purpose

separate

tax

levy

for

for which

the Act was

administration

of the

property tax system was enacted by the Legislature some two
years prior to the effective date of the funding mechanism
currently under attack.

(See Laws of Utah 1985, Chapter 88,

Section 1). Under the 1985 enactment each county possessed the
authority to impose a separate tax levy at a maximum rate equal
to that contemplated under the current funding mechanism.

The

sole change in the financing mechanism created by the current
Act was the equalization of that rate throughout the State.
Thus, it cannot be said that the enactment of S.B. 151 constituted

a dramatic change in State policy with respect to
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separate

funding

of

this

important

governmental

process.

Against that context the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
Berry by and

through Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 717 P.2d

685-686 (Utah 1985) is helpful.

670,

The Court in that case reviewed

the provisions of the Utah Product Liability Act and determined
that no portions were severable if no legitimate purpose remained once the invalid section was removed.

The courts stated

that "we cannot conclude that the Legislature would have enacted
Sections 4 through 6 without Section 3."
clear

from

enactment

the
that

legislative
the

taxing

mechanism

defray

the

costs

history

Legislature

by
of

which

commencing

wished

counties

administering

_Id.

with

to provide

could
the

at 686.

property

the

a

derive

It is
1985

separate

revenue
tax

to

system.

Assuming arguendo that any particular office is not permitted to
perform the duties required by the Act or the proceeds from the
tax rate may not be equalized, the main purpose for the separate
revenue source still remains.

Additionally, to declare this Act

unconstitutional in its entirety would cause irreparable economic harm to this State and its political subdivisions.

The loss

of some $23 million dollars of property tax revenues, in the
face

of

economic

the

loss

of

circumstances,

federal
would

revenue
do

sharing

significant

and

depressed

damage

to

the

re-appraisal and auditing efforts of the counties and State Tax
Commission undertaken in aid of assuring equality and uniformity
in assessment.
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In conclusion it is the position of the defendants
that the authority of each county to impose an unequalized tax
levy within the current statutory maximum of ,0005 is severable
from all other provisions of the Act.

The Legislature would

most certainly, as it did in 1985, have enacted a tax levy
provision in this format or another.

VI.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Senate Bill
county

151 was a result of several years of

legislative efforts in pursuit of a solution to the

problem of financing property tax administration in each of the
29 counties of the State.

Its specific provisions were sought

by the counties, endorsed by the counties and Tax Commission and
remain

supported

by

the counties and Tax Commission.

(See

Affidavit of R.H. Hansen, Chairmant Utah State Tax Commission,)
It

allows

county

statutorily

officials

designated

to

continue

responsibilities;

to

perform

Boards

of

their
County

Commissioners retain control over budgets and expenditures, they
have the authority to expend any funds they deem necessary, not
only through the proceeds of the Uniform Tax Administration levy
but through such other general fund revenue sources as they
possess.

No county officials1 responsibilities are impaired by

the statute and, accordingly, the intrusion of the Act into
local government affairs is minimal.

33

The utilization of the

funding mechanism

established

by the Legislature

(a uniform

equalized statewide levy) is a valid exercise of legislative
authority in pursuit of a remedy for a statewide problem.

Since

statehood, the Legislature and State Tax Commission have been
integrally

involved

in

the

operation

of

the

property

tax

assessment, collection and distribution systems in each county
of the State.

The State has utilized proceeds from the Uniform

School Fund (an uniform equalized statewide levy) to compensate
county officials for the preparation of real property tax maps.
The State has utilized general fund revenues to pay its share of
the costs of programs. Additionally, the Legislature has vested
in

the

State

statewide

Tax

Commission

equalization

adjustment
properties.

of

local

and
values

the

authority,

uniformity
or

even

of

in

pursuit

valuation,

re-appraisal

of

of

direct
local

To suggest that the tax levy established by the Act

was not a funding mechanism in furtherance of the matter of
statewide concern ignores both historical and current reality.
Under Utah Const. Art. XIII, Section 5 as interpreted by the
Utah Supreme Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P. 2d
49 9 (Utah 19 75) , and Salt Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment
Agency, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the funding mechanism established by the Act now under review is a permissible extension of
legislative authority in a matter of statewide concern.

It is

not a legislative imposition of the local tax for a purely local
purpose.
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In conclusion, the funding mechanism and budgeting
mechanism are analogous to other funding mechanisms found in
Utah law.
levy.

It is directly analogous to the Uniform School Fund

Additionally

government

the ACt

responsibilities

intrudes no
than

any

further

other

act

into local
previously

adopted by the Legislature delineating the structure and operation of the property tax system by local elected officials.
As such the Act should be sustained and defendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th:

ay of

Jb*^zZ2^L<

1988.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
KARL HENDRICKSON
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS
Special Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney
RONALD ELTON
Tooele County Attorney
BILL THOMAS^EETERS
Special^-DeputyyTooele County,
Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this 14th day of September,
1988, I caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Response to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, together with the attached Affidavits of L.
Brent Gardner and R. Hal Hansen to the following:
Max Miller, Esq.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
And mailed to:
Ralph Finlayson, Esq
Assistant Attorney Gpiieral
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, tfrtah 84114

BPH:L
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The Honorable Don V. Tibbs
Judge, Sixth Jjodicial District Court
for Garfield County
55 South/Main Street
Panguijxfh, Utah 84759
RE:

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co, v.
Garfield County, et al., Case No. 3273

Dear Judge Tibbs:
With a motion for summary judgment pending, I provide
this response regarding the position of the State defendants.
The State defendants in this case are the Utah State
Tax Commission, R. H. "Hal" Hansen, Chairman of the Utah State
Tax Commission, Roger ()• Tew, Utah State Tax Commissioner, Joe B.
Pacheco, Utah State Tax Commissioners, G. Blaine Davis, Utah
State Tax Commissioner, Tom L. Allen, Utah State Auditor, and
Edward T. Alter, Utah State Treasurer.
These State defendants have ministerial or
administrative roles under the statute at issue, Utah Code Ann.
S 17-19-15 (Supp. 1988). These roles are in contrast to the role
of the counties, which receive and use money raised by the tax
levies at issue. The counties, therefore, rather than the State
defendants are the real parties in interest.
The counties are vigorously and adequately representing
the interest in upholding the statute at issue. The Attorney
General has provided an opinion on the central issue involved,
which opinion speaks for itself. The opinion is already a part
of the court record and is hereby tendered to assist in
addressing the issue. The opinion is an analysis that does not
purport to bind the court and is not an unequivocal declaration
of constitutionality or unconstitutionality.
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The Honorable Don V. Tibbs
August 26, 1988
Page Two
Under these circumstances the State defendants do not
intend to be active as legal advocates in this case.
Very truly yours,

RALPH L FINLAYSON
Assistant Attorney General
Governmental Affairs Division
RLF/cwc
cc:

Patrick B. Nolan, Esq.
l/Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
David K. Detton, Esq.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF>THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
in ^"T^-^5RGARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiffs,

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

-vsGARPIELD COUNTY: THE
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:
THOMAS HATCH, SKERRELL OTT,
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE,
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR;
THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSI0>*: P . E. " HAL "
HANSEN, ROGER C. TEW,
G. ELAINE DAVIE- I I'D JOT

£.

PACEECO, L'T-.I S" ATE TAX
coMKissio'.n; 5 • r.ox L . Aixrr.',

•CNB^JW??'**. «,» * e

CASE NO. 3273

-"udqe Den v. Tibbs

TabD

Exhibit D

JAMES B. LEE (A1919)
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER (A3525)
DAVID R. BIRD (A0336)
MAXWELL A. MILLER (A2264)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES
(USA) INC., and HERCULES,
INCORPORATED,

AFFIDAVIT OF
AUSTON JOHNSON, III

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the
Utah State Tax Commission,
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO,
Utah State Tax Commissioner,
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN,
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T.
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake
County Treasurer; and GRANT L.
PENDLETON, Tooele County
Treasurer,

Civil No. 88-3457
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)
• ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Auston Johnson,

III, being

first duly sworn and upon

his oath, states as follows:
1.

I

am

an

employee

of

the

Utah

State

Auditor's

Office and have been so employed for approximately 12 years.
2.

For

approximately

the past

three

years,

I have

been the Director of Local Government Accounting and Audit in the
Utah State Auditor's Office, and before that, for approximately 9
years, I was an Audit Manager or an Auditor

in the Utah State

Auditor's Office. ,Based upon my experience in these assignments,
I have personal knowledge of the duties and functions of the Utah
State Auditor's Office.
3.

In my

capacity

as Director

of

Local

Government

Accounting and Audit in the Utah State Auditor's Office, I have,
among

other

procedures

duties,
and

the

responsibility

reporting

requirements

to establish

for Utah's counties

they relate to the Utah State Auditor's Office.
capacity,

I supervise

the county

budgetary

reporting

as

Likewise in that

requirements

estab-

lished pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 (Supp. 1987).
4.

Part

of

my

duties

in

the

Utah

State

Auditor's

Office include the regular reception of records, data, and other
reports from Utah's counties and the Utah State Tax Commission
filed pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15.
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From the data,

reports and records

submitted to the Utah State Auditor's Office

by Utah's counties and the Utah State Tax Commission, and as part
of my regular duties to compile reports, compilations,

records

and statements therefrom, I prepared a chart attached hereto and
labeled Exhibit

"Al", which chart

illustrates the operation of

Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 for 1987.

Control"

5.

Exhibit Al is entitled "Assessing and Collecting

and

is

divided

into

two

categories

-

"Contributing

Counties" or counties which remit part of the funds generated
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15 to the State Treasurer and
then to other counties, and "Receiving Counties" or all counties
which

receive

pursuant

taxes

to Utah

generated

Code

Ann.

from

the

contributing

S 17-19-15.

The

counties

columns

of

the

exhibit are explained as follows:
(a)

The first column entitled "Generated Funds"

shows the taxes raised by each county, which taxes are raised as
a

result

of

the

tax

rates

set

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

S 17-19-15.
(b)

The second column entitled "Allowable Funds"

shows the costs the Utah State Auditor has, by rule, determined
to allow as collection and assessing costs for each county.

A

copy of the relevant rule is attached and labeled Exhibit "A2."
(c)

The

third

column

entitled

"Expected

Remit-

tance" (for contributing counties) shows the amount those counties

expect

to

remit

to

other
-3-

counties

via

the

Utah

State

Treasurer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15(6).

The third

column entitled "Expected Receipt" (for receiving counties) shows
the amount those counties expect to receive from contributing
counties listed at the top of the page via the Utah State Treasurer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15(6).
(d)

Column

4

in

the

"Contributing

Counties"

portion of the exhibit is a mathematical calculation showing the
ratio of the expected remittance in column 3 to the total remittance in column 8.

Columns 5 through 7 show the remittances by

the contributing counties.

In that portion of the chart under

"Receiving Counties" the fourth column is a mathematical calculation showing the ratio of expected receipts in column 3 to the
total receipts.

The other columns in the "Receiving Counties"

portion of the chart show the ratio of expected receipt to total
remittances and the first and second remittances.

Column 8 of

that chart shows the total amount remitted.
(e)

The final column in each portion of the chart

shows that for 1987 nine counties remitted $2,090,457.24 in taxes
collected by those counties to the other 20 counties of the state
of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 17-19-15.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this affi^day of September, 1988.
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 33snaL day of

fau.

, 1988.

V&*1fcb

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at; c4/Jj/r ^C$4J,

My Commission Expires:

U\UCU

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
AUSTON

JOHNSON,

III

to

the

following

on

September, 1988:
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ralph Finlayson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
236 Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

239:092288A
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this U*>r)

day of

cansiBjnx ocwnEs
GH«RATED

OCtNTY
BCK ELDER
CACHE
EMERY
MILLARD
SALILAKE
SAN JUAN
SLHHT
UINTAH
UTAH
TOTAL

FUCS

ALLOWABLE EXPECTED % Of IDEAL
1ST
FINDS
REMITTANCE REMITTANCE REMTTIANCE

2ND
REMITTANCE

3RD
REMITTANCE

TOTAL

157,616
569.209
411,593
64,634
520,814
585,446
136,383
655,914
792,297
808,628
1,294,375
485,747
1.007,844
7,729,231
8,737,075
129,689
335,519
205,830
595,282
1,073,637
478,355
233,705
737,956
504,251
1,929,306 1,900,000
29,306

4.98 60.171.54
2.04
4.31 55,722.37
25.56 101,274.12
31.86
4.10
18.82 571,690.25
7.39
0.93

794,938.00
126,727.47
18,197.81
171,008.00
28,755.92

130,928.76
76,250.73
70,686.18
101,274.12
794,938.00
126,727.47
589,888.06
171,008.00
28,755.92

16,054,822 12,891,735 3.163.067

100.00 788,858.28

L,301.598.%

2,090,457.24

70,757.22
76,250.73
14,963.81

RECEIVING OLXNTIES

COUNTY

GENERATED
FUCS

ALLOWABLE
FINDS

84,754
124,693
376,509
451,870
59,984
93.382
1,500,704 1,539,923
566,808
500,153
103,177
149,061
107,553
141,305
283,234
438,058
115,836
264,277
76,859
246,979
65,459
102,353
13,396
64,055
138,441
64,320
280,991
115,658
SEVIER
217,566
438,561
iUUtLC.
1V*,/U
iJ6,46b
WASATCH
154,169
370,579
WASHINGTON
448,860
690,399
VtWE
25,118
96,995
WEBER
1,652,804 2,259,547

BEAVER
CARBON
DAGGETT
DAVIS
DUCHESNE
GARFIELD
GRAND
IRON
JUAB
KANE
MCRGAN
FTUTE
RICH
SANPETE

TOTAL

6,285,825 8,994,742

GRAM) TOTAL22,340.647

21,886,477

EXPECTED % OF TOTAL % OF TOTAL 1ST
RECEIPT RECEIPTS REMITTANCE REMITTANCE
1.26

2ND
REMITTANCE

TOTAL
REMITTED

19.190.16
36,209.97
16,047.30
18,844.21
32,026.85
22,046.66
16,217.39
74,390.89
71,323.95
81,740.42
17,727.08
24,340.98
35,614.16
79,440.33
106,185.19
104,146.96
103,982.16
116,056.31
34,535.95
291,532.02

30,820.72
58,155.69
25.773.06
30,265.10
51,437.32
35,408.45
26,046.24
119,476.88
114,551.15
Dl,280.72
28,470.91
39,093.29
57,198.79
127,586.62
170,540.70
167,267.17
167.002.48
186,394.39
55,467.11
468,220.43

39,939
75,361
33,398
39.219
66,655
45,884
33.752
154,824
148,441
170,120
36,894
50,659
74,121
165,333
220,995
216,753
216,410
241,539
71.877
606,743

1.47
2.78
1.23
1.45
2.46
1.69
1.25
5.72
5.48
6.28
1.36
1.87
2.74
6.10
8.16
8.00
7.99
8.92
2.65
22.40

6.85
6.84
7.64
2.27
19.18

11,630.56
21,945.72
9,725.76
11,420.89
19,410.47
13,361.79
9,828.85
45,085.98
43,227.20
49,540.30
10,743.83
14,752.31
21,584.63
48,146.29
64,355.51
63,120.20
63,020.32
70,338.08
20,931.16
176,688.40

2,708,917

100.00

85.64

788,858.25 1,301,598.96 2,090,457.21

2.38
1.06
1.24
2.11
1.45
1.07
4.89
4.69
5.38
1.17
1.60
2.34
5.23
6.99

5,872,004

EXHIBIT

Al

Distribution of Property Taxes
R130-2-1 Authority
As required by Section 17-19-15(2), this rule provides the categories of
allowable costs.
R130-2-2 Purpose and Scope
This rule sets forth the allowable costs of assessing and collecting
property taxes by counties as allowed by current legislative authority, and
for the purpose of computing the state-wide tax rate necessary to cover
these costs. This rule 1s for the purpose of cost determination and 1s not
Intended to Identify the circumstances or dictate the manner of assessing
and collecting by counties. Allowable costs will only be considered to the
extent they affect the property tax system.
30-2-3 Categories of Allowable Costs
Allowable cost categories are enumerated as follows; detail and
explanation are located 1n the Uniform Accounting Manual for Utah Counties.
1.
Accounting
2.
Advertising
3.
Advisory Councils
4.
Audit service
5.
Bonding
6.
Budgeting
7.
Building lease management
8.
Building space and related activity
9.
Central stores
10. Communications
11. Compensation for personal services
12. Data Processing
13. Depredation
14. Disbursing service
15. Employee fringe benefits
16. Employee morale, health and welfare costs
17. Exhibits
18. Insurance and Indemnification
19. Legal expenses
20. Maintenance .and repair
21. Management studies
22. Materials and supplies
23. Memberships, subscriptions and professional activities
24. Motor pools
25. Payroll preparation
26. Personnel administration
27. Printing and reproduction
28. Procurement service
29. Professional services
30. Training and education
31. Transportation
32. Travel
KEY:
1987

property tax, tax collections
17-19-15
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EXHIBIT A2

Appendix A

Appendix A

17-19-15. Separate budget for costs of assessing, collecting, and distributing property taxes — Submission to state auditor for review — Allowable costs
established by rule — Transmission to tax commission — Limitations on tax rate — Exceptions
— Adjustments.
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of property values and effective
collection and distribution of property tax proceeds, the county governing
body of each county shall annually separately budget for all costs incurred in
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal programs and submit those budgets to the state auditor for review.
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, categories of allowable costs
and shall certify submitted budgets for compliance with approved categories.
(3) Upon review and certification by the state auditor, the aggregated state*
wide costs shall be transmitted to the State Tax Commission for determination of a mandatory statewide tax rate sufficient to meet those expenditures.
By June 8 of each year the tax commission shall certify the rate to each
county auditor for inclusion upon the tax notice as a separately listed and
identified local levy.
i 4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per dollar of taxable
value of taxable property except for: (a) mandated or formally adopted reappraisal programs conforming to tax commission rules; or (b) actions required
to meet legislative, judicial, or administrative orders. Taxes levied for this
purpose may not be included in determining the maximum allowable levy for
the county or any other taxing district.
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted under this section is effective,
each taxing district within counties which had not previously levied separate
assessing, collecting, and distributing levies, shall reduce its property tax levy
by an amount equal to that paid by the taxing district in the previous year for
the cost of assessing, collecting, and distributing taxes.
(6) Revenues received by each county from the levy authorized by this
section in excess of the amount set out in the certified budget shall be transmitted to the state treasurer for equalization and distribution to the counties
in accordance with the certified budgets. Any revenue excess resulting from
an increase in collection rates upon final settlement shall be deposited by the
state treasurer in a trust account to be adjusted against subsequent years.
History: C. 1953, 17-19-15, enacted by L.
193* ch. 159,1 1; 1987, ch. 4,1 16; 19*6, ch.
3, I 97.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6. 1987, in subjection
<lt substituted "county governing body'* for
"board of county commissioners" and in subsection (3) in the second sentence substituted
"June 8" for "June 1."
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9,
1988, substituted "per dollar of taxable value
of taxable property" for "of assessed valuation"

near the beginning in Subsection (4) and made
two minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1).
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 4, § 307 provides that this section has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987.
Laws 1988, ch. 3. t 269 provides that the act
"has retroepective operation to January 1,
1988."
Cited in Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake
County Comm'n, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988).

